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THE PROCESS DUE INDEFINITELY 
DETAINED CITIZENS· 
CARL TOBIAS .. 
A very controversial feature of the "war on terror" is the scope of 
the power which Congress has granted President George W. Bush 
to designate suspected terrorists enemy combatants and indefinitely 
detain them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has most fully, if not clearly, resolved this question. 
The United States incarcerated two citizens with little process for 
more than a year in the Charleston and Norfolk naval brigs. The 
first litigated three habeas corpus petitions before the Fourth Circuit 
and a fourth to the Supreme Court before the government released 
him. The second convinced a South Carolina district judge to grant 
his habeas petition, although the Fourth Circuit overturned that 
decision and the government effectively mooted the Supreme Court 
appeal by indicting him. The war on terror's indefinite character 
indicates that additional detainees will be imprisoned, and will 
pursue relief, in Fourth Circuit districts and the Fourth Circuit will 
decide appeals of the determinations. 
These ideas suggest that the Fourth Circuit war on terror 
jurisprudence merits review. The Article first descriptively analyzes 
the government's use of executive authority to detain numerous 
Americans and non-citizens, then critically assesses Fourth Circuit 
resolution of habeas challenges to detention. Finding that the 
court's jurisprudence is unclear, the Article proffers 
recommendations that clarify the precedent with a meticulously 
calibrated balance of national security and civil liberty. 
* Copyright© 2007 by Carl Tobias. 
** Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Sashi 
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INTRODUCTION 
One highly controversial aspect of the "war on terror" is the 
scope of the statutory authority that Congress has delegated 
President George W. Bush to designate and indefinitely detain as 
enemy combatants persons whom the Government suspects are 
terrorists. In none of the twelve regional circuits has this issue been 
so thoroughly ventilated, albeit unclearly resolved, as in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
The government imprisoned two American citizens with minimal 
process for over a year in the Norfolk and Charleston naval brigs. 
Yaser Esam Hamdi litigated three Fourth Circuit appeals and one 
Supreme Court appeal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before 
his ultimate release. 1 Jose Padilla persuaded a South Carolina district 
judge to issue a habeas writ, but the Fourth Circuit reversed that 
determination, and the United States essentially mooted the Supreme 
Court appeal by choosing to indict him after three years' detention.2 
The war on terror's indefinite nature suggests that more detainees 
will be held, and will seek relief, in Fourth Circuit districts, and this 
appellate court will resolve appeals of the decisions. 
These propositions mean that the Fourth Circuit war on terror 
jurisprudence requires scrutiny, which this Article undertakes. 
Section I descriptively reviews how the Government has invoked 
executive power to detain many Americans and non-citizens. Section 
II critically analyzes Fourth Circuit disposition of habeas petitions 
attacking incarceration. Because the Fourth Circuit's jurisprudence 
lacks clarity, Section III offers suggestions that elucidate the 
precedent through a finely calibrated balance of national security and 
civil liberty. 
I. DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT 
Non-citizen and citizen indefinite detentions jeopardize the rule 
of law and expose the flaws in the "realist critique"-the notion that 
compliance with international law would undermine American and 
global security-thereby requiring discontinuation of the strictures 
l. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 
542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 2002); infra note 210 and accompanying 
text (documenting his release). 
2. See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005), rev'd, 423 F.3d 386, 
397 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062 (2006). 
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which ordinarily govern.3 For instance, executive branch officials 
proffer many arguments to suspend the rules that normally apply in 
criminal prosecutions. The ideas encompass the cost, time, and risk 
which federal court trials are said to impose, the purported lack of 
necessity for safeguarding terrorists' liberties, the assertions that 
available information fails to meet strict evidentiary requirements and 
national security demands its secrecy be maintained, and the view 
that indefinite detentions provide the Government much needed 
control.4 
The United States has imprisoned 15,000 terrorism suspects for 
long periods. Since 2001, executive officers have followed then-
Attorney General John Ashcroft's directive to use "every available 
law enforcement tool" for incapacitating those "who participate in, or 
lend support to, terrorist activities" with: (1) protracted detentions 
through criminal charges and material witness warrants for people in 
America legally, and (2) immigration charges for suspects in the 
nation unlawfully, which some observers have described as profiling 
mostly targeted at U.S. Arab and Muslim communities.5 
The Bush Administration rationalizes this effort with the 
practical contentions enumerated above and with legal arguments 
based mainly on Article II of the Constitution; Ex parte Quirin, the 
World War II Supreme Court decision that involved Nazi saboteurs; 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that Congress 
passed immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks; as 
3. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE w AR ON TERRORISM 5 {2003) (observing that since 
September 11, society has not struck a proper balance between national security and 
individual liberties); Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: 
Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1407, 1410-11 (2002). 
4. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 977 {2002) (observing 
that military tribunals permit the use of classified evidence to convict suspects); Dickinson, 
supra note 3, at 1437; see also Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism and Military 
Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 328, 330-32 (2002) {highlighting the problems with 
federal courts and international trials and suggesting that military commissions may offer 
the best alternative). See generally James Mann, For Bush, Realpolitik is No Longer a 
Dirty Word, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, § 4, at 5 (describing the dynamics of the Bush 
presidency regarding foreign policy). 
5. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION 
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 
12, 17 (April 2003) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. For comprehensive assessments of 
detentions, see COLE, supra note 3; Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good 
Citizens: Legitimizing The War on Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 88-91 (2004). 
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well as material witness and immigration legislation.6 The detentions 
are shrouded in secrecy, which restricts external monitoring and 
which courts have thus far generally maintained.7 However, the 
initiatives to detain non-citizens and corresponding legal attacks on 
those efforts, especially regarding the persons whom America has 
incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay, raise issues that differ from citizen 
detentions and litigation and, therefore, are not this Article's focus.8 
The United States has also detained American citizens by 
labeling them enemy combatants. In 2002, President Bush so 
certified Yaser Hamdi, whom the Northern Alliance had purportedly 
captured on an Afghan battlefield and whom the United States 
6. See U.S. CONST. art. II; 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I 
2001)); 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2006). See generally MICHAEL 
DOBBS, SABOTEURS: THE NAZI RAID ON AMERICA (2004) (outlining the Nazi sabotage 
plan that led to the Quirin case); LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LA w (2003) (providing a complete overview of the 
Quirin trial); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (interpreting the AUMF as it applies to 
three specific issues in the war on terrorism); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power 
in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673 (2005) (offering a critical reply to the 
Bradley & Goldsmith piece). 
7. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'I Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (holding that information regarding persons detained after 9/11 need not be 
disclosed), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104, 1104 (2004); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 
308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that newspaper publishers do not have a right to 
access deportation proceedings that present national security concerns), cert. denied, 538 
U.S. 1056, 1056 (2003). But see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710, 2002 
FED App. 0291P (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that there is a First Amendment right of access 
to deportation proceedings). 
8. Neither is the detention of Ali Saleh Kahleh Al-Marri, the habeas petitioner in 
Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164-66 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug. 22, 
2007) (No. 06-7427), because he is a non-citizen. I mention Al-Marri, however, in 
footnotes when applicable because it is an important Fourth Circuit war on terror case. 
The U.S. has detained 600 non-citizens at Guantanamo Bay. OIG REPORT, supra note 5; 
MICHAEL RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANTANAMO: WHAT THE WORLD SHOULD KNOW 
10 (2004). Observers have reported horrible conditions, the use of abusive measures to 
extract confessions and more information, and that many have attempted suicide. Jeffrey 
Toobin, Inside the Wire, NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2004, at 36, 38; COLE, supra note 3, at 39-
43; Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1313-14; see, e.g., Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004). Few detainees had much process until 
2004 when the Supreme Court decided the appeals of some, so all detainees have received 
some process, and the United States will schedule at most seventy-five for military 
commission trials. See generally Carol D. Leonnig & John Mintz, Judge Says Detainees' 
Trials Are Unlawful, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2004, at Al (describing the outcomes of and 
reactions to the Hamdi district court decision); Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Interviews 14 
Qaeda Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, at A18 (describing the procedures 
that have been put in place for those who are charged with war crimes); Carol Rosenberg, 
Base Plan Unchanged, Bush Aides Say, MIAMI HERALD, May 9, 2006, at A3 (stating that 
at most seventy-five will have commission trials). 
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imprisoned without access to counsel until February 2004.9 A habeas 
corpus petition was filed on his behalf with the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which issued rulings 
favorable to Hamdi, but the Justice Department sought review of the 
trial judge's determinations in the Fourth Circuit. The court of 
appeals issued three opinions essentially reversing the district court 
treatment, and the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the 
Government could detain Hamdi as an enemy combatant, although 
he must receive due process to challenge this designation.10 
In May 2002, the Government served a material witness warrant 
in Chicago's O'Hare Airport on Jose Padilla, alleging that he was 
implicated in a plot to detonate a "dirty bomb," and four weeks later 
the Chief Executive designated Padilla an enemy combatant. 11 His 
attorney filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, which the judge denied; 
however, the Second Circuit ruled that Congress had not empowered 
the President to detain Padilla. The Supreme Court vacated that 
opinion because he sued in the wrong jurisdiction.12 When Padilla 
refiled in the United States District Court for the District of South 
9. See Jerry Mark on, Terror Suspect, Attorneys Meet for I st Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 
4, 2004, at B3. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and 
Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 503, 525-28 (2003) 
(addressing judicial review of two Hamdi challenges in the Fourth Circuit); Ingrid Brunk 
Wuerth, The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern Lessons from 
Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1567 (2004) (discussing how cases from 
the War of 1812 can help illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of deferring to 
Presidential war powers); COLE, supra note 3 (generally outlining military detentions and 
enemy combatant status); Dickinson, supra note 3 (same). 
10. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 542 
U.S. 407 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 
F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002). 
11. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699-700 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 
542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004); see Donna R. Newman, The Jose Padilla Story, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 39, 40 (2003). Larry Thompson, then-Deputy Attorney General, argued Quirin was 
"clear Supreme Court" authority to detain Padilla "under the laws of war as an enemy 
combatant." Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, Press Conference Concerning 
Jose Padilla at the U.S. Department of Justice (June 10, 2002); see also Leti Volpp, The 
Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002) (describing a post-
September 11 trend in which Muslims and Arabs are "identified as terrorists, and are 
disidentified as citizens"). The U.S. relied on these authorities to hold him 
"incommunicado for nearly two years." See Lyle Denniston, Enemy Combatant Gets 
Lawyer, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 2004, at A3. 
12. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 
352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004); see Deborah Sontag, 
Terror Suspect's Path From Streets to Brig, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at Al; Deborah 
Sontag, U.S. Judge Finds Padilla Competent to Face Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at 
A14. 
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Carolina, the trial judge granted the habeas petition in February 
2005. 13 A Fourth Circuit panel reversed this determination that 
September, and the Government effectively mooted Padilla's 
Supreme Court appeal by prosecuting him two months later. 14 
This Article's next segment considers how district and appellate 
judges have treated the two petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed 
by American citizens contesting their designation and detention as 
enemy combatants and emphasizes the Fourth Circuit's resolution. 
II. THE DETENTION CHALLENGES AND THEIR RESOLUTION 
A. The Hamdi Litigation 
1. District Court 
Judge Robert Doumar, who initially entertained the habeas 
corpus petition filed on Yaser Hamdi's behalf with the Eastern 
District of Virginia, rigorously scrutinized the Government's 
arguments for indefinitely detaining Hamdi and found that executive 
constitutional authority, separation of powers, and Ex parte Quirin 
mandated no judicial deference to the citizen's enemy combatant 
designation.15 Judge Doumar "appointed counsel and ordered access 
... before allowing the United States even to respond," suggested 
that the American Government was possibly hiding disadvantageous 
information, and required the United States to produce considerable 
material. 16 He strenuously questioned "everything in the Mobbs 
declaration," the affidavit prepared by a Government official which 
certified Hamdi was an enemy combatant; said that he "intended to 
13. See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005). The same judge 
rejected Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri's habeas petition mainly because he was a non-citizen. 
See Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677-78 (D.S.C. 2005). A Fourth Circuit panel 
initially reversed the decision; however, the court will rehear the appeal en bane. See Al-
Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 195 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted, Al-Marri v. 
Wright, (Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427). 
14. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062 (2006) (denying certiorari); see also 
Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2005) (denying order to transfer Padilla from 
military custody); Neil A. Lewis, Court Refuses U.S. Bid to Shift Terror Suspects, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at Al (describing the case and reaction). 
15. Judge Doumar's approach warrants somewhat limited review because the 
Supreme Court rejected it. See infra notes 62--64 and accompanying text. 
16. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460--62 (4th Cir. 2003); see also id. at 476 
(showing that the panel rejected Judge Doumar's actions in Hamdi). 
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'pick it apart' piece by piece;" and concluded that the information 
tendered fell "far short of supporting Hamdi's detention."17 
2. Fourth Circuit 
The United States Government pursued three appeals from the 
rulings by the district court, and the Fourth Circuit overturned much 
of Judge Doumar's treatment. For example, the appellate panel 
cabined review and maintained that Quirin supported judicial 
acquiescence to presidential views on indefinite detentions. 18 
Moreover, the appeals court did not scrutinize Hamdi's 
imprisonment; rather it trusted the Mobbs declaration's allegation 
that Hamdi was in the combat zone, recited this particular fact as 
"undisputed," and denied Hamdi access to counsel. 19 The court did 
so, even though the declaration was executed by a bureaucrat who 
lacked any first-hand knowledge about the seizure. The judges also 
found that the Non-Detention Act presented no bar to incarceration 
of an "armed and hostile citizen captured on the battlefield during 
wartime," which the AUMF and 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) concomitantly 
authorized.20 The panel expressed grave concerns that the judiciary 
not interfere with executive and legislative prerogatives to make war 
or jeopardize the ongoing military initiative.21 
The Fourth Circuit denied the suggestion for rehearing en bane, 
yet the opinions filed in this matter elucidated the panel judgment 
and afforded helpful recommendations for deciding the case. 
Illustrative were Judge Michael Luttig's proposals to articulate 
17. Id. at 462. Judge Doumar evidenced greater rigor than the district judge in Padilla 
I. See infra Part Il.B.l. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 
2002) (affording other examples of Judge Doumar's rigor). 
18. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Ex parte Quirin, 
317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) (upholding the President's decision to detain suspected German 
saboteurs and try them by military commission). The panel did reject the most extreme 
U.S. position that "courts may not second-guess" a military enemy combatant designation. 
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283. 
19. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 472-77. Hamdi received limited access in February 2004. 
Markon, supra note 9. 
20. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 467. The judges held that the Non-Detention Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 4001(a), did not modify the rule on enemy combatant detentions and that 
Hamdi's detention was authorized by the AUMF's "necessary and appropriate force" 
words and 10 U.S.C. § 956(S)'s appropriation to detain "persons 'similar to prisoners of 
war.'" See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 467-68. 
21. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 462-63, 471-77. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 6.10-6.12 (7th ed. 2004) (outlining the 
President's role in times of war); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LA w § 4-6 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief). 
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clearer legal standards for reviewing detentions.22 Judge Diana 
Gribbon Motz correspondingly authored an eloquent disquisition on 
how the judicial responsibility to protect liberty compels a more 
searching factual inquiry for which she offered astute practical 
guidance.23 
3. Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist as well as Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer, 
wrote the plurality opinion which found that Congress had authorized 
the President to detain U.S. citizens when he labeled them enemy 
combatants, but that these individuals were entitled to procedural due 
process.24 Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment that Yaser Hamdi should 
receive due process but dissented from certain features of the process 
which Justice O'Connor afforded as well as from the holding that 
lawmakers had granted the Chief Executive this detention power.25 
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, 
asserting that the Government could only detain citizens if the United 
States prosecuted them or lawmakers had suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus under Article 1.26 Justice Clarence Thomas also 
dissented, effectively acquiescing to the theory urged by the 
Department of Justice that the President had nearly complete 
authority over individuals designated as enemy combatants.27 
The plurality first determined that the executive branch had 
power to imprison citizens by labeling them enemy combatants.28 
Justice O'Connor seemingly acknowledged that the Non-Detention 
22. He also urged that the Fourth Circuit undertake clearer factfinding. See Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 357 (4th Cir. 2003). 
23. See id. at 368-76. This may have presaged her opinion for the panel majority in 
Al-Marri. See Jerry Markon, Vacancies Whittle Away Right's Hold on Key Court, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 8, 2007, at Al. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, the Hamdi panel decision 
author, defended the decision by criticizing both judges' views. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
337 F.3d at 341-45. Wilkinson stated: "[t]o compare [Hamdi's) battlefield capture to the 
domestic arrest in Padilla v. Rumsfeld is to compare apples and oranges." Id. at 344. 
24. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507-39 (2004). I broadly quote the plurality 
to capture best its intent. 
25. See id. at 539-54; see also infra notes 68--69, 85, 87 and accompanying text (further 
discussing the plurality opinion in Hamdi). 
26. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-79; U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2. 
27. See Hamdi, at 579-99; U.S. CONST. art. II. 
28. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-24; see also supra notes 9-14 (discussing the initial 
lower court challenges to both Hamdi's and Padilla's enemy combatant status); infra notes 
148, 156, 170-79 and accompanying text (addressing Padilla's status as an enemy 
combatant). 
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Act, which Congress had passed in 1971, might require express, 
specific authorization from lawmakers to detain citizens on American 
soil.29 The jurist concluded, however, that the September 2001 
AUMF supplied this predicate because that authorization necessarily 
contemplated the detention of individuals who purportedly were 
captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan.30 Justice O'Connor 
recognized that the AUMF "does not use specific language of 
detention" but nevertheless held that this Act constituted 
authorization "[b]ecause detention to prevent a combatant's return to 
the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war" and, 
therefore, by "permitting the use of 'necessary and appropriate force,' 
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the 
narrow circumstances considered here."31 The plurality 
determination also characterized Ex parte Quirin as "the most 
apposite precedent that we have on the question of whether citizens 
may be detained in such circumstances," remarking that the World 
War II opinion "both postdates and clarifies Milligan,'' which was a 
Civil War-era decision.32 
Justice O'Connor admonished, however, that "[e]ven in cases in 
which the detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there 
remains the question of what process is constitutionally due to a 
citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status. "33 She ascertained 
that the situation's resolution necessitated a "careful examination 
both of the writ of habeas corpus ... and of the Due Process Clause, 
which informs the procedural contours of that mechanism in this 
instance. "34 
29. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-18; see Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). 
30. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-21; Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 
No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I 2001)); 
infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
31. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2, 115 
Stat. at 224; supra note 6 and accompanying text (introducing the AUMF). But cf Al-
Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 177--89 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that the AUMF did not 
authorize Al-Marri's detention), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427); see 
also AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224; supra note 6 and accompanying text 
(introducing the AUMF). 
32. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). But see 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 569-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality's reliance on 
Quirin). But cf Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 178--89 (affording a different analysis of Quirin and 
Milligan). See generally TRIBE, supra note 21, § 4-6 (discussing the significance of 
Milligan). 
33. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524. 
34. Id. at 525; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (addressing the suspension of 
habeas corpus); id. amend. V (Due Process Clause); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243, 2246 (2000) 
(outlining the process for seeking a writ of habeas corpus). 
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The plurality observed that the litigants held radically different 
views of the process which should be due in this circumstance, yet 
began on "common ground"35: "[a]ll agree that, absent suspension, 
the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual 
detained within the United States," and Congress has suspended the 
writ "[o]nly in the rarest of circumstances .... "36 Justice O'Connor 
stated that "[a]t all other times, [the writ] has remained a critical 
check on the Executive, ensuring that it does not detain individuals 
except in accordance with law," and the parties agreed the writ had 
not been suspended.37 The habeas corpus legislation "makes clear 
both that Congress envisioned that habeas petitioners would have 
some opportunity to present and rebut facts and that courts in cases 
like this retain some ability to vary the ways in which they do so as 
mandated by due process."38 
The Government argued that the flexibility which the habeas 
corpus technique offered and Hamdi's situation meant that the 
Mobbs declaration-the affidavit submitted by a Department of 
Defense official certifying Hamdi was an enemy combatant-would 
afford sufficient process for two major reasons.39 Justice O'Connor 
"easily rejected" the first contention by the United States that 
Hamdi's detention in a combat zone was "undisputed."40 The 
circumstances of his seizure were neither factually conceded "nor 
susceptible to concession in law," while the " 'facts' that constitute the 
alleged concession [were] insufficient to support Hamdi's 
detention."41 The jurist warned that an assertion that an individual 
"resided in a country" where combat operations are proceeding 
represented no concession that the person was " 'captured in a zone 
of active combat' operations in a foreign theater of war" and it 
"certainly is not a concession that" the detainee met the 
Government's enemy combatant standards.42 In short, the plurality 
35. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525; see ALFRED C. AMAN JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 180 (2001 ). 
36. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (addressing 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus). 
37. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("[t]he 
writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest"). 
38. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243, 2246 (outlining the 
process for habeas corpus). 
39. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526; see also supra note 19 (introducing the Mobbs 
declaration). 
40. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526. 
41. Id.; see also supra notes 22-23 (treating two opinions the plurality invoked). 
42. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527. 
1698 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
opm1on repudiated "any argument that Hamdi ha[d] made 
concessions that eliminate any right to further process."43 
Justice O'Connor found more difficult the Government's second 
argument that greater factual exploration was improper and 
unwarranted in light of the exceptional "constitutional interests at 
stake."44 Under this contention's extreme version, "[r]espect for 
separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of 
courts in matters of military decision making in connection with an 
ongoing conflict" would totally eliminate individual process and 
relegate courts to ascertaining whether the general detention system 
was authorized.45 The United States claimed that, at most, judges 
should review enemy combatant designations with the highly 
deferential "some evidence" criterion, which focuses exclusively on 
the Government's factual premise to support its determination and 
asks whether any evidence sustains the conclusion.46 If applied to the 
enemy combatant situation, the criterion would mean that a 
reviewing court assumes the Government-enunciated basis is accurate 
and scrutinizes only whether the premise was valid.47 Hamdi 
responded by asserting Supreme Court precedent required that 
someone whom the Executive detains have an opportunity to 
challenge the detention's legal and factual underpinnings before a 
neutral tribunal.48 
Justice O'Connor said that both positions emphasized legitimate 
concerns and highlighted the frequent tension between the autonomy 
the Government claims it needs to pursue efficaciously a specific 
objective and the process a citizen asserts is due before the individual 
will be deprived of essential constitutional rights.49 She observed that 
the "ordinary mechanism," which the Supreme Court employs in 
balancing these "serious competing interests" and ascertaining the 
procedures required to guarantee that a citizen is not "deprived of 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See id. at 527-28. 
48. See id. at 528. Judge Doumar essentially concurred with this because he 
apparently found the process should approximate that which would attend a criminal trial. 
See also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing the district court decision in 
Hamdi). 
49. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528. See generally AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 35, at 
172-73 (describing the due process procedures that may be imposed in certain 
circumstances); id at 18~2 (describing the modern method for determining the process 
due a person articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," is the test 
articulated in the 1976 decision of Mathews v. Eldridge.so 
Mathews requires a judge to determine the process which is due 
in a specific case "by weighing 'the private interest' " that official 
behavior will affect against the claimed governmental interest, 
" 'including' the function involved and the burdens the Government 
would face in providing greater process."s1 The Mathews formula 
then envisions those concerns' judicious balancing through an 
assessment of the risk that the private interest will suffer improper 
deprivation, were process decreased, and the "probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards."s2 
Justice O'Connor scrutinized the balancing test's particular 
elements in turn. Justice O'Connor first declared that there were 
"substantial interests" on each side of the case. She characterized 
Hamdi's as the "most elemental of liberty interests-the interest in 
being free from physical detention by one's own government"-at 
due process's core, and an interest whose fundamental nature the 
Court had always safeguarded and would not minimize in the Hamdi 
appeal.s3 The Justice proclaimed that neither wartime circumstances 
nor accusation of treasonous conduct offsets this strong value because 
"commitment for any purpose" would be a significant liberty 
deprivation which mandates due process protections.s4 Justice 
O'Connor emphasized due process's "absolute" character in that it is 
not dependent on the validity of a claimant's allegations and found 
the Mathews calculus unchanged by the assertions regarding a 
detainee's misconduct or the organizations with which he purportedly 
associated.ss In short, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed a citizen's 
essential right of freedom from involuntary confinement by the 
50. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 (quoting Amendment V 
of the U.S. Constitution); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 336. See generally William Van Alstyne, 
Cracks in the "New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977) (discussing the due process revolution). 
51. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. See generally Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (analyzing how much process is due, pre-Mathews). 
52. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (citation omitted). See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The 
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. 
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976) 
(providing an overview of the due process factors set out in Mathews); AMAN & MAYTON, 
supra note 35, at 172-75, 178, 180-82 (outlining due process and Mathews). 
53. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) 
(stating that freedom from bodily restraint is the core liberty protected by the due process 
clause). 
54. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)). 
55. Id. 
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United States without due process and balanced liberty's curtailment 
against the opposing governmental interests.56 
The plurality then assessed the "weighty and sensitive" interests 
of the Government in preventing individuals who have fought for the 
enemy from resuming combat against the United States.57 Justice 
O'Connor said that the Constitution entrusts those who are best 
situated to undertake, and most politically accountable for, strategic 
decisions with basic war-making tactical matters.58 The jurist also 
emphasized that the plurality's due process analysis considered the 
potential of litigation to distract military officials fighting overseas, to 
reveal delicate intelligence material, and to "require a futile search 
for evidence buried under the rubble of war," insofar as the 
application of heightened measures would foster these possibilities.59 
Justice O'Connor declared that striking the appropriate 
constitutional balance was of great national importance during 
ongoing combat, but found the values which the United States holds 
dear and the privilege of citizenship equally significant.60 The jurist 
observed that the "[n]ation's commitment to due process is most 
severely tested" in emergencies, yet during these very moments 
America must preserve its domestic commitments to those tenets for 
which the United States battles abroad.61 After the Justice recognized 
the competing factors, she determined that neither the process 
recommended by the Government, nor that which the district court 
judge who first treated Hamdi apparently contemplated, struck the 
correct balance.62 Applying the Mathews test, Justice O'Connor 
found the risk that a detainee might be erroneously deprived of 
liberty under the rule suggested by the United States unacceptably 
high,63 while certain "additional or substitute procedural safeguards" 
entertained in the district court were not warranted, given their 
56. Id. at 531; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("[m]ere 
public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's 
physical liberty"). 
57. Harndi, 542 U.S. at 531. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 531-32. 
60. Id. at 532; see also infra note 88 and accompanying text (observing that national 
security issues should remain a consideration). 
61. Harndi, 542 U.S. at 532 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-
65 (1963)). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 532-33 (citation omitted). 
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"limited 'probable value' and the burdens they may impose on the 
military."64 
The plurality, therefore, held that a detained citizen who seeks to 
contest his enemy combatant designation must receive notification of 
the classification's factual premise and a "fair opportunity to rebut 
the Government's factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker."65 Justice O'Connor specified that the "right to 
notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be granted at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,' " declaring that 
"[t]hese essential constitutional promises may not be eroded."66 
The jurist simultaneously admonished that "the exigencies of the 
circumstances" may require that, apart from these rudimentary 
components, enemy combatant designation proceedings be tailored to 
relieve "their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time 
of ongoing military conflict."67 For example, Justice O'Connor stated 
that the decisionmaker might need to accept hearsay as the most 
dependable Government evidence and to apply a "presumption in 
favor of" this proof, so long as the presumption is rebuttable and 
there is a fair opportunity to refute it.68 Thus, after the United States 
tenders credible evidence that the detainee satisfies the enemy 
combatant standards, the "onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut 
that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the 
criteria."69 
Justice O'Connor justified affording this basic procedural due 
process with illustrations of how it would minimally affect the central 
war-making functions. For example, Justice O'Connor said initial 
battlefield captives would only receive the process which the plurality 
detailed after the Government continues to hold persons it has 
seized.70 The jurist contended that documentation respecting 
battlefield detainees "already is kept in the ordinary course of 
military affairs," so requiring an affidavit to summarize pertinent 
64. Id.; see also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (outlining the district 
court's decision). 
65. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. See generally Friendly, supra note 51 (analyzing how 
much process is due, pre-Mathews); Van Alstyne, supra note 50 (discussing the due 
process revolution). 
66. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted); see also AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 
35, at 182 (addressing the timing of a hearing). 
67. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
68. Id. at 534; see also infra text accompanying note 87 (reiterating Justice O'Connor's 
ideas in the text). 
69. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534. 
70. Id.; see also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing why Justice 
O'Connor believes more process may be needed). 
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material would impose little burden.71 She also believed that 
restricting the hearings to the purported combatant's actions would 
not disrupt efforts by military officers to wage war or meddle in the 
armed forces strategy.72 
Justice O'Connor summarized by remarking that the thorough 
protections which accompany detention challenges in other situations 
might be improper and unworkable for enemy combatants.73 
However, she asserted that the "threats to military operations" were 
not so substantial "as to trump a citizen's core rights to challenge 
meaningfully the Government's case and to be heard by an impartial 
adjudicator. "74 
Justice O'Connor concluded with justifications for the plurality's 
holding and further explication of the result. First, she observed that 
the plurality necessarily rejected the assertion by the United States 
that separated powers mandated a sharply circumscribed role for the 
judiciary in this situation.75 O'Connor warned that the argument 
which the Justice Department proffered would serve "only to 
condense power into a single branch" and "would turn our system of 
checks and balances on its head. "76 She concomitantly proclaimed 
that the Supreme Court had "long since made clear that a state of war 
is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of 
the Nation's citizens" and that the "Constitution ... most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at 
stake."77 Justice O'Connor similarly acknowledged the critical nature 
of the war power even as she declared that the authority "does not 
remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties."78 
The plurality also stated that, absent legislative suspension, the writ of 
habeas corpus "allows the [j]udicial (b]ranch to play a necessary role 
in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an 
important judicial check on the Executive's discretion in the realm of 
detentions. "79 
71. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534. 
72. Id. at 535. 
73. Id.; see also supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (concerning allowing the 
detainee to rebut the evidence). 
74. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535. 
75. Id. at 535-36. 
76. Id. at 53~37. 
77. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)). 
78. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, amend. V (addressing the respective powers of 
the legislative and executive branches and due process). 
79. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (citation omitted); see also supra notes 3~37 and 
accompanying text (explaining that habeas corpus is an important check on the 
Executive). 
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Justice O'Connor deemed the Government-proffered "some 
evidence" standard insufficient because due process mandates a 
system in which a detained citizen may refute his designation.80 She 
explained that the Supreme Court had previously deployed the "some 
evidence" idea as a "standard of review, not as a standard of proof."81 
Judges have principally used the concept in scrutinizing an 
"administrative record developed after an adversarial proceeding-
one with process" similar to that required in Hamdi.82 The criterion, 
therefore, was ill-suited to circumstances "in which a habeas 
petitioner has received no prior proceedings before any tribunal and 
had no prior opportunity to rebut the Executive's factual assertions 
before a neutral decisionmaker."83 The Justice correspondingly 
declared, "Hamdi has received no process," and summarily rejected 
the notion that his military interrogation "constitutes a 
constitutionally adequate factfinding before a neutral 
decisionmaker. "84 
Justice O'Connor next tendered additional guidance. She 
remarked that an "appropriately authorized and properly constituted 
military tribunal" could satisfy the demands which the plurality had 
articulated and that existing military regulations may offer the 
requisite process in similar circumstances.85 Without this process, a 
district judge who entertains a habeas petition from an alleged enemy 
combatant must guarantee that due process's minimum requirements 
have been afforded.86 The jurist reiterated that a habeas court might 
accept affidavit evidence, if the judge enables the purported 
combatant to tender facts rebutting the governmental return.87 
Justice O'Connor implored district courts to proceed with caution 
and undertake a "factfinding process that is both prudent and 
incremental," while the jurist similarly trusted that judges confronting 
80. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537; see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text 
(describing the Government's argument as to how the evidence should be reviewed). 
81. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537. 
82. Id. (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). 
83. Id.; see also supra notes 65--66 and accompanying text (describing Justice 
O'Connor's discussion regarding the importance of allowing an opportunity to rebut the 
government's evidence). 
84. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537; see also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (stating 
that the Court found that Hamdi made no concessions). 
85. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538; see also Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, 
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Regulation 190-8, ch. 1, § 6 (1997) 
(dictating that under the Geneva Convention, tribunals should be made available for 
detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status). 
86. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538. 
87. Id. 
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these delicate matters would "pay proper heed" to national security 
and the "constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties that 
remain vibrant even in times of security concerns."88 The plurality, 
thus, vacated the Fourth Circuit judgment and remanded the case for 
further proceedings. 89 
B. The Padilla I Litigation 
1. District Court 
The trial court's disposition of Padilla deserves evaluation 
because it relied upon Hamdi's Fourth Circuit treatment and decided 
questions that the Supreme Court ultimately resolved.9° For instance, 
District Judge Michael Mukasey extensively applied Quirin, which 
distinguished "lawful and unlawful combatants [who] are likewise 
subject to capture and detention," 91 finding incarceration power by 
analogy,92 and which he said based military tribunal approval on 
Article II presidential authority.93 He also deferred when ruling that 
a tepid "some evidence" proof burden would justify citizen detention; 
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), the Non-Detention Act, governed only civilian 
imprisonment; and the AUMF empowered Bush to detain Padilla.94 
88. Id. at 539. 
89. Id. For more analysis of Hamdi, see generally Bradley and Goldsmith, supra note 
6 (discussing the Hamdi plurality opinion and its attention to the AUMF); Trevor W. 
Morrison, Hamdi's Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
411 (2006) (highlighting the differences between the O'Connor and Scalia opinions in 
Hamdi); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 
(2005) (examining executive power from a purely administrative Jaw perspective); infra 
note 210 and accompanying text (documenting Hamdi's release). 
90. See generally Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
For example, the district court in Padilla determined whether the President had authority 
to detain a U.S. citizen and what evidence standard should be applied in determining 
whether the prisoner was lawfully detained and exhibited judicial deference. See infra 
notes 91-96 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text 
(outlining the Fourth Circuit's acquiescence to executive power in Hamdi). Trial court 
disposition also contrasted with the Hamdi district court resolution and the Padilla Second 
Circuit approach. 
91. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 3G-31 
(1942)). 
92. If the Supreme Court perceived detention as Jess onerous than a military tribunal 
trial and "approved even that greater consequence, then our case is a fortiori from 
Quirin." Id. at 595. 
93. Congress had expressly approved military tribunals in World War II, so Quirin 
specifically reserved the question of whether the Executive alone might have power to 
create them. Id. at 595-96 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28-29). 
94. Id. at 590, 596--99, 605-10. Judge Mukasey seemed to base deference on limited 
authority and competence to decide the issue and great executive power but did hold 
Padilla should have access to counsel. Id. at 599-605; see Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. 
2007] INDEFINITELY DETAINED CITIZENS 1705 
The judge also invoked Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer for 
the notion that the Executive was "operating at maximum authority" 
when holding Padilla as an unlawful combatant."95 He located this 
effort in the first category of Justice Robert Jackson's renowned 
template which addresses interbranch disputes, making the initiative 
least vulnerable to attack and judicial scrutiny, as the President has 
full executive power and all Congress delegates.96 
2. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit's use of the model articulated by Jackson, 
however, yielded different results. It held that: (1) "the President 
lacks inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to 
detain American citizens on American soil outside a" combat zone; 
(2) the Non-Detention Act is an "explicit congressional 'denial of 
authority,' " placing the endeavor in Jackson's last tier; and (3) the 
"AUMF does not authorize the President to detain [citizens] on 
American soil," leaving this action in the third category, so the 
Executive is acting in contravention of congressional action and its 
actions are most susceptible to attack and judicial scrutiny.97 
Numerous propositions support the holdings which the appeals 
court espoused. The panel first assessed relevant constitutional text 
and observed that the Commander-in-Chief powers warranted 
deference.98 The panel stated, however, that the federal judiciary 
must scrutinize and resolve challenges to executive authority, if it 
proceeds, even when making "war, in the face of apparent 
congressional disapproval [and these separated] powers concerns are 
§ 4001(a) (2000); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541(Supp.I2001)). 
95. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)). See generally Youngstown at Fifty, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 1 
(2002) (affording many articles evaluating Youngstown at fifty from numerous 
perspectives); MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS 
OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977) (affording a valuable, comprehensive historical account 
of the Youngstown case). 
96. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson used a second, or 
twilight, zone and a third tier in which executive power is least and receives the most 
scrutiny. See Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 373, 410-16 (2002) (affording Jackson's analytical framework). 
97. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 
U.S. 426 (2004). 
98. Id. at 712-13; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 6.2 (noting that 
Hamilton believed it was "dangerous to restrict executive powers too severely"); TRIBE, 
supra note 21, § 4-6 (outlining the President's executive war powers). 
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heightened" by domestic initiatives.99 Finding no specific authority, 100 
the appellate court explored whether inherent executive power 
satisfied the document's "carefully crafted restraints" to guarantee 
that only the branch which had authority used the power.101 Because 
the Constitution authorizes lawmakers, not the President, to "define 
and punish ... offenses against the Law of Nations;"102 identify the 
breadth accorded, and suspend, the habeas corpus writ;103 and make 
exceptions from the Third Amendment ban on peacetime quartering 
of soldiers,104 the discrete grants are "a powerful indication that, 
absent express [legislative approval,] the President's Commander-in-
Chief powers do not support Padilla's confinement."105 The 
"specificity with which the framers allocated" this domestic authority 
to Senators and Representatives, and the lack of "any even near-
equivalent grant ... in Article H's catalogue of executive powers" 
also prevented the judges from "read[ing] any such power into the 
Commander-in-Chief clause."106 The panel intimated that lawmakers 
might possess detention authority, but the court stated that the 
"President, acting alone, does not." 107 
The majority then canvassed relevant Supreme Court precedent. 
It believed Quirin inapplicable, as the Justices in that case left 
unresolved whether the Executive alone could establish military 
tribunals and found legislative approval for commission trial of 
"combatants who violated the laws of war" to support military 
jurisdiction.108 The panel further distinguished Quirin because 
99. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 713. Jackson said "Congress, not the Executive, should 
control [the use of war powers] as an instrument of domestic policy" and deferred little to 
Executive use of military power. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644. 
100. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 713; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LA w § 4.1 (2d ed. 2002) (outlining Justice Jackson's concurrence). 
101. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714-15; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) 
(affording the quotation in this text); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88 (affording the other 
concepts in the remainder of the clause in the text). 
102. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 10; see Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714. 
103. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2; see Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714 (analyzing the suspension 
clause). 
104. U.S. CONST. amend. III; see also Padilla, 352 F.3d at 714-15 (stating that the Third 
Amendment reflects the "Framers' deep-seated beliefs [about preventing] military 
intrusion into civilian life"). 
105. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 715 (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 631-32). For a similar analysis of Youngstown, 
see Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 190-94 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug. 
22, 2007) (No. 06-7427). 
108. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 716 (citation omitted). "Quirin does not speak to whether, or 
to what degree, the President may impose military authority upon U.S. citizens 
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lawmakers had enacted a statute109 and the Nazi saboteurs admitted 
they were enemy troops. The Supreme Court, thus, never reached 
Padilla's dispositive issue-the limits of "executive military 
jurisdiction-as the 'Quirin petitioners upon the conceded facts, were 
plainly within those boundaries.' "110 The appeals court found 
inapposite a pair of Fourth Circuit Hamdi opinions because they were 
predicated on the detainee's seizure in an active combat zone 
overseas.111 Finally, the panel distinguished the Supreme Court's 
Prize Cases112 as implicating "capture of enemy property-not 
[citizen] detention" 113 and a presidential endeavor Congress had 
authorized114 one-hundred years before legislators had passed the 
Non-Detention Act.115 
Having determined that constitutional text and relevant Supreme 
Court opinions did not allow the Executive to detain American 
citizens, the panel surveyed whether lawmakers had approved the 
incarceration. The majority consulted the Non-Detention Act's 
terminology: "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained 
by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."116 The 
judges read these words as a proscription on all citizen detentions, a 
"conclusion first reached by the Supreme Court." 117 Further, the 
panel deemed the legislative history "fully consistent with" its view 
because the enactment's sponsor and the major opponent "repeatedly 
confirmed" that the law governed presidential attempts to detain in 
domestically without clear congressional authorization. We are reluctant to read into 
Quirin a principle [the Court] specifically declined to promulgate." Id. 
109. Because Congress did not pass the Non-Detention Act until 1971, the panel 
remarked that the "Quirin Court did not have to contend with Section 4001(a), [so that 
Quirin's] usefulness is now sharply attenuated." Id. 
110. Id. (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46 (1942)). The panel said Quirin and Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), concluded that "primary authority for imposing 
military jurisdiction upon American citizens lies with Congress [and] that-at a 
minimum-an Act of Congress is required to expand military jurisdiction." Padilla, 352 
F.3d at 717. 
111. Hamdi had no occasion "to address the designation as an enemy combatant of an 
American citizen captured on American soil." Padilla, 352 F.3d at 717; see Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003). 
112. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
113. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 717-18. The dissent invoked The Prize Cases for broad 
inherent constitutional power. Id. at 726. 
114. Id. at 718; see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668-70 (discussing 
Congressional authorization to suppress insurrection). 
115. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 718; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) (providing the 
Non-Detention Act). 
116. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 718 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)). 
117. See id. See generally Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479 n.3 (1981) (interpreting 
§ 4001(a)). 
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wartime and evinced Congress' intent that it "must specifically 
authori?'.e detentions." 118 The appellate court said that the legislation 
precluded civilian and military detentions, 119 finding: (1) this idea left 
executive war powers "unabridged" because the "President, acting 
alone" lacks inherent authority to detain;120 and (2) a statute's 
"placement" should not "trump text, especially" when clear and 
"fully supported by legislative history." 121 The panel concluded that a 
"precise, specific" law "is required to override" the enactment's ban 
on all citizen detentions122 and, thus, searched for this approval. 123 
The appeals court detected none in the AUMF's phrasing124 and 
construed the words vis-a-vis the tenets which the Supreme Court 
articulated in Ex parte Endo: judges must interpret wartime 
measures "to allow for the greatest possible accommodation 
between" war exigencies and civil liberties and find that "lawmakers 
intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly 
and unmistakably indicated by the language they used."125 Nothing in 
the plain terms granted the Executive power to detain American 
citizens on U.S. "soil, much less the express authorization required by 
section 4001(a) and the 'clear,' 'unmistakable' language" which Endo 
demanded. 126 Because the AUMF was "meant to constitute specific 
statutory authorization within" the War Powers Resolution,127 the 
118. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 718-19. These indicia and its passage by 257 to 49 were 
"strong evidence [the Act] means what it says [: no) citizen can be detained without a 
congressional act authorizing the detention." Id. at 720. 
119. See id. at 720. The United States asserted that the Non-Detention Act only 
precluded civilian detentions. Id. at 720-21. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 721. The United States said placing§ 4001(a) in a section on prisons did not 
limit executive war power, and next to § 4001(b)'s exclusion of military prisons, showed 
Congress intended to exclude military detentions. Id. 
122. Id. at 720; see also supra notes 24, 30-31 and accompanying text (describing the 
Hamdi plurality's interpretation of the AUMF). 
123. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 722. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 13.4 
(assessing Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 (1981)). 
124. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 722; see also id. at 725-26 (reproducing the AUMF). 
125. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944) (holding that "whatever power the War 
Relocation Authority may have had to detain classes of citizens, pursuant to Executive 
Order No. 9066, it had no authority to subject citizens who were concededly loyal to its 
leave procedure"); see Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723. For a discussion on the importance of the 
Endo decision, see generally Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1933 (2003). 
126. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723; see WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 38 (1994). 
127. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723; see The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000); 
see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 6.12 (discussing the war powers 
resolution); Robert J. Glennon, Jr., The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later, 78 AM. J. 
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panel thought it "inconceivable" that Congress would mandate such a 
resolution to employ force overseas yet "leave unstated and to 
inference something so significant and unprecedented as 
authorization to detain American citizens under the Non-Detention 
Act." 128 Moreover, 10 U.S.C. § 956(5), which "authorizes nothing 
beyond the expenditure of money," failed to satisfy the Non-
Detention Act, the requirements that Endo had propounded as well 
as Fourth and Fifth Amendment guarantees. 129 
3. Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit disposition on 
procedural grounds.13° Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the 
majority opinion in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas joined, held that the petitioner's immediate custodian, the 
commander of the South Carolina naval brig where the United States 
detained Padilla, was the only proper respondent. 131 The Chief 
Justice grounded the holding on the express terminology in the 
habeas corpus legislation, which states that the appropriate 
respondent is "the person who has custody" over the petitioner, and 
on relevant Supreme Court determinations which have articulated an 
"immediate custodian" rule. 132 Therefore, the majority observed 
INT'L. L. 571, 581 (1984) (concluding that The War Powers Resolution did not give 
Congress the intended increase in its war-making power). 
128. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723; see also Bryant & Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, supra 
note 96, at 386-98 (suggesting that neither the AUMF nor the Patriot Act grants the 
Executive Branch the authority to detain American citizens). 
129. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723-24. Judge Richard Wesley, who concurred in part and 
dissented in part, differed with respect to many aspects of the majority opinion. For 
example, he found the "President, as Commander-in-Chief, has inherent authority" for, 
and the "Joint Resolution specifically and directly authorized," detentions. Id. at 726. 
130. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004). The opinion, therefore, 
warrants less comprehensive assessment than the determination in Hamdi. However, 
Padilla deserves some evaluation, as this case might have been the litigation in which a 
federal court actually provided the due process mandated by Hamdi. See infra notes 154-
56. 
131. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 440-43; see also 10 U.S.C. § 951(c) (2000) ("There shall be 
an officer in command of each major military correctional facility. Under regulations to 
be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, the officer in command shall have custody and 
control of offenders confined within the facility which he commands, and shall usefully 
employ those offenders as he considers best for their health and reformation, with a view 
to their restoration to duty, enlistment for future service, or return to civilian life as useful 
citizens."). 
132. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434-35; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242-43 (2000) ("The writ, or 
order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person 
detained."); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885) ("[T]he writ must be directed to 
the person in whose custody the party is."); Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) ("[T]he custodian is the person having a day-to-day control over the prisoner."); 
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longstanding federal court practice accorded with the statute and case 
law and reaffirmed that the proper respondent is the warden of the 
facility in which the individual is detained, not the Attorney General, 
the Secretary of Defense, or another remote supervisory officer. 133 
Chief Justice Rehnquist ascertained that neither recognized 
exceptions to this doctrinal concept nor those which Padilla and the 
four dissenting Supreme Court members urged were applicable. 134 
For instance, the majority summarily rejected the habeas petitioner's 
arguments that the rule is flexible and should not govern the facts 
related to his unusual circumstances.135 The Chief Justice specifically 
found that nothing undermined the rationale or statutory foundation 
for the doctrinal approach when physical custody is at issue in "core" 
habeas proceedings, such as the one which implicated Padilla, even 
though the majority acknowledged the notion of custody had 
expanded over time. 136 The majority similarly recognized the unique 
nature of Padilla's incarceration; however, it concluded that the 
appellee was basically disputing physical custody which the Executive 
had imposed. 137 These findings prompted Chief Justice Rehnquist to 
hold that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, the court in which Padilla had originally filed, lacked 
jurisdiction.138 The majority observed that lawmakers had inserted 
phraseology in the habeas corpus enactment to prevent a judge from 
issuing the habeas writ on behalf of an applicant who was located a 
substantial distance from the court. It also found this commonsense 
reading justified by other provisions of the habeas legislation, related 
statutory exceptions to the "district of confinement" notion, and 
Jones v. Biddle, 131 F.2d 853, 854 (8th Cir. 1942) ("The statutes relating to habeas corpus 
manifestly contemplate that the respondent named in an application for habeas corpus 
shall be the person, within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, who has the physical 
custody of the person of the petitioner and who is capable of producing him in court."). 
133. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435-38; see also Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707, 712 
(7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the warden of the facility is the proper custodian). 
134. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435-38; see also id. at 454-55, 459--04 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
135. See id. at 435-38. But see Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973) 
(rejecting "interpretations of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in 
stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic 
procedural requirements."). 
136. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435-37; see also Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1972) 
(holding that there is proper jurisdiction other than where the custodian is located if a 
majority of the petitioner's contacts with the custodian occurred in the other jurisdiction). 
137. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 439-40; see Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 
U.S. 484, 499-500 (1973) (explaining that the jurisdictional requirements of the writ can be 
flexible in certain circumstances). 
138. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442. 
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Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(a).139 Finally, the Chief 
Justice thought distinguishable important Supreme Court authority 
which Padilla urged should be dispositive.140 The majority, therefore, 
overturned the Second Circuit judgment and remanded the appeal for 
"dismissal without prejudice. "141 
C. The Padilla II Litigation 
1. District Court 
Five days later, Padilla refiled a habeas petition in the district of 
South Carolina, where the United States had incarcerated him. 142 
U.S. District Judge Henry Floyd observed that three Supreme Court 
opinions controlled his resolution: Hamdi, Ex parte Quirin, and Ex 
parte Milligan. 143 He began the Hamdi analysis by stating that Hamdi 
was allegedly taken into custody while on the battlefield in 
Afghanistan, where he was carrying a weapon against U.S. forces, 144 
but the Government arrested Padilla unarmed in the O'Hare Airport 
and claimed he was plotting to attack the nation. 145 Judge Floyd said 
that the Hamdi plurality deemed his incarceration appropriate under 
the narrow factual circumstances presented-actively waging war 
against U.S. forces on a battlefield overseas 146-and that the force 
used to detain Hamdi came within the AUMF provisions. 147 In 
contrast, the Government first used a material witness warrant to 
hold Padilla on U.S. soil, and the later decision to designate and 
139. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2242 (2000) (detailing who may issue a writ 
of habeas corpus and how one is to be filed, respectively); FED. R. APP. P. 22(a) (detailing 
habeas corpus proceedings). See generally Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 617 
(1961) (discussing congressional intent behind limiting a court's jurisdictional ability to 
issue the "great writ"); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 (1952) (explaining the 
authority of district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus under the 1867 act). 
140. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 444-47. See generally Braden, 410 U.S. 484 (discussing the 
history of the writ); Strait, 406 U.S. 341 (same). 
141. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 451. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred 
to explain their understanding of the statute's construction in light of the majority holding. 
See id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, considered wrong 
the majority's description of Padilla's case as a "simple challenge to physical custody 
[which] should be resolved by slavish application of a 'bright-line rule.'" Id. at 455. The 
dissent ascertained that the specific rule was "riddled with exceptions fashioned to protect 
the high office of the Great Writ" and contended that "this is an exceptional case that we 
clearly have jurisdiction to decide." See id. 
142. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (D.S.C. 2005). 
143. Id. at 684. 
144. Id. 
145. See id. at 684-85. 
146. Id. 
147. ld.at685-86. 
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imprison him as an enemy combatant was outside the AUMF 
"necessary and appropriate force" strictures. 148 
The court dismissed the Government's argument that Quirin 
provided sufficient justification for Padilla's detention and must 
control his situation. 149 Judge Floyd invoked the Padilla Second 
Circuit opinion for the proposition that Quirin is limited to situations 
in which Congress has explicitly permitted citizen detention outside 
of the normal channels. 150 
The jurist then relied on Milligan for the idea that "[t]he 
President may not unilaterally establish military commissions in 
wartime 'because he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate 
sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws,' " 151 
remarking that the military tribunal in this case "lacked any 
jurisdiction to try Milligan when the civilian 'courts are open and 
their process unobstructed.' " 152 The judge recognized that Quirin 
limited Milligan; however, he asserted that Milligan's essential 
premises control: "[t]he detention of a United States citizen by the 
military is disallowed without explicit Congressional authorization." 153 
The court next evaluated whether the AUMF had granted the 
President sufficient congressional authority to detain citizens 
militarily. 154 The jurist found that the Non-Detention Act prohibits 
the United States from detaining a citizen "except pursuant to an Act 
of Congress."155 The Government argued that the AUMF authorized 
the detention of citizens and "the Non-Detention Act does not apply 
to the military's wartime detention of enemy combatants." The court 
disagreed and relied upon the resolution's plain language, concluding 
that it failed to authorize Padilla's detention, which directly 
contradicted the Non-Detention Act.156 Judge Floyd emphasized that 
the AUMF did not reach a "citizen [who is] arrested in a civilian 
setting, such as an United States airport,'' but it might permit the 
detention of a citizen captured on the battlefield.157 The judge found 
148. Id. at 686. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 686-87. 
151. Id. at 687-88 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866)). 
152. Id. at 687 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121). 
153. Id. at 688; see also Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 178-89 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(affording similar analyses of Quirin and Milligan), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug. 22, 2007) 
(No. 06-7427). 
154. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 688. 
155. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 689. 
2007] INDEFINITELY DETAINED CITIZENS 1713 
that Ex parte Endo instructed that the purpose of Congress and the 
Executive in passing a wartime statute "was to allow for the greatest 
possible accommodation between those liberties and the exigencies of 
war," 158 so a court must interpret legislation to encroach upon 
citizens' civil liberty only insofar as the Act clearly and explicitly 
provides. 159 Thus, because the AUMF did not include language that 
"clearly and unmistakably" granted the Executive authority for 
holding citizens such as Padilla, the AUMF failed to override the 
Non-Detention Act. 
Judge Floyd easily rejected the government argument that the 
AUMF permitted citizen imprisonment, made in the preamble to the 
presidential order which authorized Padilla's detention, observing 
that "just because the President states Petitioner's detention is 
'consistent with [American law does not necessarily make] it so.' "160 
Judge Floyd also summarily dismissed the United States' contention 
that the Non-Detention Act's placement in the Crimes and Criminal 
Procedure section of the United States Code indicated that the 
legislation governed only civilian detentions, reiterating that the 
statute was "clear, simple, direct, and unambiguous" and applied to 
all citizen detentions. 
The court next turned to the Government's argument that the 
President's inherent power as Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief 
authorized the detention of citizens such as Padilla. Employing 
Justice Jackson's revered Youngstown concurrence, Judge Floyd 
ascertained that because Congress had legislated on citizen detentions 
through the Non-Detention Act, the President's authority was at its 
"lowest ebb, for then [the Executive] can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional power of Congress 
over the matter." 161 Finding that no law supported the Government's 
contention that the Executive has the inherent authority to detain 
Padilla, Judge Floyd ruled, as had Jackson, that "Congress, not the 
Executive, should control utilization of the war power as an 
158. Id. (quoting Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1945)); see also Al-Marri v. Wright, 
487 F.3d 160, 188-89 (4th Cir. 2007) (affording a similar analysis of Endo), reh'g en bane 
granted, (Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427). 
159. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 689. 
160. Id.; see also Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 178-89 (affording a similar analysis of the 
AUMF). 
161. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 690 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The judge found U.S. support 
for its position in The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 
(1862), and Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000), factually inapplicable to 
this case. Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 689. 
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instrument of domestic policy."162 Thus, the judge rejected the 
Government's argument, as that position would "offend the rule of 
law and violate this country's constitutional tradition, but it would 
also be a betrayal of this Nation's commitment to the separation of 
powers that safeguards our democratic values and individual 
liberties. "163 
Finally, the jurist remarked that Padilla's detention was a 
civilian, not a military, law enforcement matter. 164 Judge Floyd 
suggested that civilian law furnished ample measures for the 
Government to detain and prosecute Padilla, so his extraordinary 
military detention was not only unlawful, but also unnecessary. 165 
Therefore, as Congress had not suspended the writ of habeas corpus, 
the jurist ordered Padilla released.166 
2. Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit decision in the Padilla litigation warrants 
careful evaluation, as it is the highest court to address the questions 
raised.167 However, the unanimous panel opinion deserves minimal 
precedential value because the court subsequently issued an order 
which undermined its earlier determination. 168 Indeed, the court 
sharply criticized the Government's litigation posture and rejected its 
suggestion that the determination be vacated. 
Judge Luttig opened his analysis emphasizing the training which 
Padilla allegedly received from al-Qaeda and its affiliates in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.169 He recounted that Padilla ostensibly 
met senior al-Qaeda operations planner, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, 
who supplied training, financing, and travel documents and directed 
that Padilla go to the United States and destroy apartment buildings. 
When he returned from international training, the FBI arrested 
Padilla in the O'Hare Airport before he could implement the alleged 
plot. 
162. Id. (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
163. Id. at 690-91. 
164. Id. at 691. 
165. See id. at691-92. 
166. Id. at 692; see also Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 189-95 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(affording similar analysis of inherent power and Youngstown), reh'g en bane granted, 
(Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427). 
167. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). 
168. Order, Padilla v. Hanft, No. 05-6392, CA-04-2221-26AJ (4th Cir. Dec. 21, 2005). 
169. I rely in this paragraph on Padilla, 423 F.3d at 388-90. The judge seemed to draw 
the following factual allegations recounted in the opinion from the U.S. factual statements 
in the joint appendix. See id. 
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Judge Luttig began his legal assessment with the idea that the 
Hamdi plurality interpreted the AUMF as reaffirming the venerated 
law of war principle that allows combatant detentions "to prevent a 
combatant's return to the battlefield," which is a "fundamental 
incident of waging war."170 Reasoning that the AUMF, as construed 
by the Hamdi plurality, enabled individuals, such as Hamdi, to be 
designated and imprisoned as enemy combatants, the jurist asserted 
that Padilla could be so labeled and confined as well. 171 The judge 
stated that Padilla, like Hamdi, took up arms in Afghanistan against 
Afghan forces aligned with the United States, and he associated with 
forces in Afghanistan hostile to America.172 
Judge Luttig relied upon Quirin to bolster his conclusion that the 
President had authority to designate Padilla an enemy combatant and 
militarily detain him. 173 Like the Hamdi plurality, Judge Luttig could 
not distinguish Haupt, the American citizen dispatched by Nazi 
Germany to attack United States war production facilities and 
detained in this country, from Padilla, who was also sent to commit 
hostile acts on American soil before his O'Hare capture. Thus, 
Padilla satisfied the enemy combatant definition under both Quirin 
and Hamdi, so his detention was "unquestionably authorized by the 
AUMF as a fundamental incident to the President's prosecution of 
the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan." 
The jurist rejected Padilla's assertion that his detention was 
unlawful. First, Padilla argued that the Hamdi plurality opinion was 
confined to the petitioner's narrow factual situation-capture on the 
battlefield in Afghanistan.174 The judge dismissed this contention, as 
the Hamdi plurality "never even mentioned the locus of the 
petitioner's capture,"175 while finding his detention permissible 
because the AUMF's authorization of necessary and appropriate 
force implicitly sanctioned "detention to prevent a combatant's return 
to the battlefield [as a] fundamental incident to waging war." 176 The 
jurist dismissed the notion that the locus of capture supported the 
plurality's reasoning, even as he admitted that the plurality 
acknowledged that Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan when 
170. Id. at 391 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality 
opinion)). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 391-92. 
173. I rely in this paragraph on id. at 392. 
174. Id. at 393. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion)). 
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responding to the Hamdi dissent. 177 Thus, Judge Luttig concluded 
that, although the Hamdi plurality holding is narrow, it does not limit 
presidential authority to detain individuals who take up arms against 
the United States, "depending upon the geographic location where 
that enemy combatant happens to be captured."17s The judge 
reinforced this position by observing that the Hamdi plurality read 
Quirin to support Haupt's detention, even though he was captured 
domestically .179 
The Fourth Circuit also dismissed the argument that military 
detention was unnecessary or inappropriate because Padilla was 
amenable to criminal prosecution.1so The court reasoned that 
criminal prosecution may not achieve the same result as military 
detention-preventing a combatant's return to the battlefield-and it 
might allow communications between a suspected belligerent and his 
confederates and impede Executive attempts to glean intelligence 
from the detainee. 1s1 These factors make military detention, rather 
than criminal prosecution, both necessary and appropriate uses of 
force which the AUMF prescribes. 1s2 
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Padilla's contention that the 
AUMF is not a clear legislative statement authorizing detentions, as 
both Ex parte Endo and Quirin require, interpreting neither decision 
to mandate a clear statement rule. The panel depended on the 
Hamdi plurality opinion for the idea that the AUMF provided a 
sufficiently clear statement when Justice O'Connor said that "it [was] 
of no moment that the AUMF does not use the specific language of 
detention"1s3 and the resolution " 'clearly and unmistakably' 
authorized Hamdi's detention." 184 Thus, Judge Luttig concluded that 
the authorization for Hamdi's detention applied equally to Padilla.1s5 
Finally, the jurist easily disposed of the argument that Ex parte 
Milligan prevented both the Executive and Congress from trying 
civilians in a military tribunal because the Hamdi plurality 
determined that Quirin held Milligan inapplicable to enemy 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 394. 
179. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 394 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 518 (2004)). 
180. Id. at 394. 
181. Id. at 394-95. 
182. Id. at 395. 
183. Id. at 396 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519). 
184. Id. at 394 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 519). 
185. Id. 
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combatants,186 so Milligan did not govern Padilla, whom the President 
had designated an enemy combatant. 187 
After the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, 
Padilla filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. 188 Before the Justices 
could address the petition, the Government indicted Padilla for 
terrorist activities and sought to transfer him from South Carolina 
military custody to Florida civilian custody. 189 The United States also 
proposed that the Fourth Circuit opinion be withdrawn.190 The panel, 
in an unusual action, denied both Government requests, 191 intimating 
that the litigation strategy was an effort to avoid Supreme Court 
review 192 and questioning why facts which necessitated Padilla's 
military detention were not sufficiently compelling to preclude his 
transfer to civilian custody. 193 The Fourth Circuit's rejection of the 
Government's motions based upon the inconsistent United States 
actions severely erodes the determination's validity, although the 
Supreme Court ultimately ordered that Padilla be transferred to 
civilian custody.194 
D. Summary By Way of Transition 
This evaluation of Fourth Circuit precedent which resolved 
habeas corpus petitions filed by citizens who disputed their enemy 
combatant designations and indefinite detentions finds that the 
appellate court's jurisprudence lacks sufficient clarity. Thus, the next 
section of this Article affords suggestions for elucidating the law with 
a carefully refined balance of the national security and civil liberty 
interests which are at stake. 
186. Id. at 396. 
187. Id. at 396--97. 
188. Order, Padilla v. Hanft, No. 05-6392, CA-04-2221-26AJ (4th Cir. Dec. 21, 2005). 
189. Id. at 1-2. 
190. Id. at 2. 
191. Id. at 7. 
192. Id. at 4. 
193. Id. at 5-6. 
194. Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084, 1084-85 (2006). In fairness, my criticism of the 
Fourth Circuit for equating Padilla with Hamdi may be attributable more to the lack of 
clarity in the Hamdi Supreme Court plurality opinion, which the Fourth Circuit was bound 
to follow. See, e.g., supra notes 28-32, 67-69 and accompanying text. 
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Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. An Introductory Word About Scope and Organization 
The ideas below assume that the Hamdi Supreme Court plurality 
opinion is a very important precedent, albeit splintered and with 
caveats. A few reasons suggest that the Fourth Circuit's Padilla 
decision warrants less weight and that more relevance should be 
assigned to the district court's treatment of that case. For example, 
the three-judge lower court panel that issued the Fourth Circuit ruling 
too easily conflated the factual scenarios of Hamdi and Padilla and 
overvalued the ramifications of that equation. Padilla's last-minute 
indictment also discredited the Fourth Circuit opinion, a view 
reinforced by Judge Luttig's withering critique of the United States' 
litigation tactics, particularly its motion to vacate the determination. 
The final section, thus, briefly criticizes the Fourth Circuit's Padilla 
opinion and recommends that courts deemphasize it and rely instead 
on the trial judge's habeas framework, if warranted by the facts which 
specific lawsuits challenging detention present. Regardless of 
whether jurists subscribe to this guidance, this part then offers 
suggestions for the minimum due process that judges should grant 
citizens who attack the validity of their designations as enemy 
combatants. 
B. A Critique of Padilla and Suggestions for Its Future Treatment 
Several considerations undermine the Padilla Fourth Circuit 
decision, especially as compared to the Hamdi Supreme Court 
plurality opinion and the Padilla trial court resolution. First, Padilla 
is a determination by a three-judge appellate court panel, rather than 
the en bane circuit, much less the Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit 
also elided in an overly facile way the difference between Hamdi's 
battlefield capture and Padilla's domestic airport seizure. This meant 
the Hamdi plurality ruling governed Padilla, so the court ascertained 
that lawmakers had empowered the President to designate and 
imprison him as an enemy combatant and that he should not have 
received habeas. Moreover, the panel undervalued Judge Floyd's 
enunciation and application of habeas and his finding that Padilla 
deserved a writ. Third, his eleventh-hour prosecution after lengthy 
incarceration, which essentially mooted the Supreme Court appeal, 
discredited the Fourth Circuit opinion that had been issued two 
months earlier. This perspective derives much credence from the 
Government's suggestion, although rejected, that the jurists withdraw 
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the decision and from Judge Luttig's scathing criticism of the tortuous 
U.S. litigation strategy, which he intimated eviscerated the factual 
predicate on which the appellate determination rested. Three 
Justices concomitantly penned an illuminating explanatory statement 
that accompanied the denial of Padilla's certiorari petition, which 
admonished that federal courts act promptly to insure the habeas 
corpus writ's "office[s] and purposes ... are not compromised," if the 
United States were to modify his status again.195 
These developments, especially the opinion's repudiation by its 
author and by the Government withdrawal motion, sapped the ruling 
of any vitality it once enjoyed. Indeed, although this determination 
technically remains the law of the circuit, the judgment is now so 
discredited that jurists must ignore or sharply circumscribe its 
application and treat as most relevant the Hamdi Supreme Court 
plurality opinion and the Padilla district court ruling. 
Insofar as judges follow the above proposals, courts should 
attempt to harmonize the O'Connor and Floyd determinations 
through meticulous case-by-case analyses of individual petitioners' 
factual circumstances. For example, jurists must generally accord a 
citizen who is captured on the battlefield the process articulated in 
the Hamdi plurality decision and reviewed below. A citizen whom 
the Government arrests on United States territory, designates an 
enemy combatant, and imprisons should typically receive the habeas 
corpus safeguards espoused and applied by Judge Floyd. His careful 
explication and application of habeas furnish a salutary template from 
which district judges may extrapolate to address the myriad, 
particular factual scenarios that the ongoing conflict will undoubtedly 
generate.196 These views obtain because, for instance, this citizen is 
entitled to attack his incarceration's propriety through habeas in 
federal court, the Government must justify the imprisonment of a 
195. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1064 (2006). The Hamdi Supreme Court plurality 
may deserve greater responsibility than the Fourth Circuit for certain criticisms I make of 
Padilla. See supra note 194. 
196. These examples are meant to be illustrative and suggestive. For example, the 
locus of capture might be indicative, but not dispositive, as Judge Luttig states in Padilla. 
See supra notes 174--79 and accompanying text. Thus, as a general matter, the citizen 
taken on the battlefield overseas should have due process while the citizen arrested on 
U.S. soil must receive habeas in federal court. More specifically, the passage of time 
between Hamdi's battlefield capture and Padilla's O'Hare arrest as well as Padilla's 
prosecution indicate both could have received habeas in federal court. The United States' 
need for information that alleged terrorists possess may also be relevant. A related, but 
less workable, construct is Justice O'Connor's exigent/non-exigent approach. See infra 
notes 216-17 and accompanying text. These ideas reinforce the need for a meticulously 
calibrated evaluation of the facts that specific detention challenges present. 
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citizen arrested on United States soil, the Executive arguably lacks 
power to so designate and hold a citizen, and Justice O'Connor 
specifically observed that Hamdi was a very narrow ruling limited to 
the peculiar facts of battlefield capture. The unpredictable as well as 
fact-specific and intensive character of situations that will arise, the 
virtually unprecedented nature of the judicial inquiry which habeas 
requires in this context, and the skeletal legislative and case law 
provision for habeas's application to these new situations complicate 
the elaboration of more definitive, refined suggestions. 
Finally, even if the Padilla Fourth Circuit opinion enjoys greater 
applicability than envisioned, this will not modify the 
recommendations below for the process due citizens, as the appellate 
court remanded to the trial court with instructions that it deploy the 
analytical construct enunciated by the Hamdi plurality ruling. For 
instance, Justice O'Connor admonished lower courts to guarantee 
that American citizens have notice of the factual bases for detentions 
and meaningful hearing opportunities to challenge their legitimacy. 
C. The Process Due Citizens 
Numerous factors impair articulation of thorough, salient 
guidance for judging citizens' designation as enemy combatants. One 
is that due process and habeas corpus are quite general, amorphous, 
and capacious. Defining them is complicated because the Executive 
has rarely detained citizens without prosecution. Yet, the Hamdi 
plurality opinion identified the process that is due in many situations 
and furnished individuals who lack notice of reasons for detentions 
and hearing opportunities greater safeguards than those who had this 
process, were convicted, exhausted appeals, and later sought relief. 197 
These views may illuminate why the Hamdi plurality outlined both 
tenets, while it afforded more suggestions and examples than nuanced 
dictates and offered certain guidance that was terse, partial, or 
unclear. 
197. The major executive detention case is Quirin. 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see also Zadvydas 
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (characterizing the interpretation of a statute that would 
allow for the indefinite detention of aliens by the executive as one that would raise serious 
constitutional questions). For cases defining due process, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
100, § 7.3.3; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, §§ 13.9-13.10. Justice O'Connor stated 
that due process informs habeas's procedural contours as a judicial review mechanism. 
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). But see id. at 553, 575 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the plurality exceeds its authority under the Due Process Clause 
"to prescribe what procedural protections it thinks appropriate."). 
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Other complications include determining the Justices' alignments 
on issues which Hamdi litigated and the problems that judges will 
face as they evaluate various dimensions of Supreme Court 
treatment, namely, aspects which secured less than a majority. 
Instructive are the plurality ruling's features that concurring and 
dissenting Justices Souter and Ginsburg approved and those which 
dissenting Justice Thomas supported, a circumstance epitomized by 
his vote to uphold citizen incarceration. 198 
The war on terror also differs significantly from conventional 
military engagements. For instance, the notions of "hostilities" and 
the "opposition" remain uncertain, and lawmakers have yet to 
declare war formally. 199 Moreover, the war on terror will generate a 
plethora of scenarios in which neutral decisionmakers assiduously 
calibrate the habeas process and balance the frequently conflicting 
values that implicate security and liberty. 
Another dilemma is how to conceptualize the hearings which 
ascertain whether the United States has properly detained citizens. 
Their denomination as criminal or civil would facilitate the 
identification of salutary rules. The proceedings might be described 
as quasi-criminal or a civil-criminal hybrid. Nonetheless, the 
deleterious ramifications for citizens deemed enemy combatants-
liberty's indefinite deprivation and perhaps life imprisonment-locate 
the hearings closer to the criminal end of the spectrum.200 
198. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 578, 587-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Ginsburg did "not mean to 
imply agreement that the Government could claim an evidentiary presumption casting the 
burden of rebuttal on Hamdi, or that an opportunity to litigate before a military tribunal 
might obviate or truncate enquiry by a court on habeas." Id. at 553-54 (internal citations 
omitted). This issue is additionally complicated because Justice Samuel Alito has replaced 
Justice O'Connor, the plurality opinion's author, and Chief Justice John Roberts has 
replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
199. The conflict appears sui generis but may resemble the Korean "police action" and 
analogous initiatives since. See sources cited supra notes 95-96; see also supra notes 186-
87 and accompanying text. See generally Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, The 
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002) (discussing 
how often the United States has committed armed forces into combat without a formal 
declaration of war). 
200. See Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778-83 (1994); 
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 
21, § 13.9(a) (discussing the criminal procedure standards that must be applied before an 
individual can be deprived of liberty). Insofar as the hearings are conceptualized as 
criminal, detainees will secure greater procedural safeguards; namely, those in the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In contrast, 
military tribunals, as presently constituted, would afford detainees fewer procedural 
safeguards. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, the Justices, who believed that detention was valid 
and the Mathews analytical framework. was preferable for treating 
citizens designated enemy combatants, may have resolved Hamdi 
incorrectly as the opinions by Justices Souter and Scalia argued.201 
However, a majority thought detention legitimate, while a plurality 
favored use of Mathews in this situation. Thus, I assume these ideas 
reflect the modern doctrine when tendering my views. 
Justice O'Connor left several particulars for Congress, perhaps 
because she recognized that the Constitution delegates military 
governance to legislators, including who are "enemy combatants," 
and shared authority for federal procedure, such as mechanisms 
which regulate the nascent hearings.202 The jurist might also have 
appreciated the difficulties surveyed above. They encompass how to 
posit cogent guidance in one fact-bound ruling and accommodate 
security and liberty during the unprecedented military initiative. 
Lawmakers should expeditiously prescribe devices that will 
thoroughly govern future hearings through the consultation and 
incorporation of readily available sources, when necessary, which 
judges may deploy, if warranted, pending the adoption of 
comprehensive legislation. Most germane are the habeas statute;203 
the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA);204 the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)205 and the various rules that 
201. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539-44 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); id. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting); se·e also supra Part Il.B.2 (reviewing Second 
Circuit analysis of the authority issue); supra Part 11.A.3 (offering greater treatment of the 
Mathews formula); infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text (suggesting why Mathews 
balancing test may have been inappropriately applied in Hamdi). 
202. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-75 (2000). See generally Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (analyzing 
shared authority for federal procedure); Peter H. Schuck, Terrorism Cases Demand New 
Hybrid Courts, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at B13 (arguing for a new due process model in 
enemy combatant cases); Jack L. Goldsmith & Neil Katya!, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19 (same). Of course, the Supreme Court, not Congress, 
ultimately decides what process is due. 
203. See 28 u.s.c. §§ 2241-2261 (2000); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION § 15 (4th ed. 2003). See generally RANDY HERTZ & JAMES s. LEIBMAN, 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2001) (providing a 
comprehensive guide to federal habeas corpus procedure). 
204. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000). See 
generally Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of 
September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 451-53 (2002) (discussing CIPA's effect 
on criminal procedure); Cameron Stracher, Eyes Tied Shut: Litigating for Access Under 
CJPA in the Government's "War on Terror," 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.173 (2003) (detailing 
CIPA's restrictions on public access to judicial proceedings). 
205. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801--63 (2000); see also 
United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 554 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding electronic 
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effectuate this legislation; new enemy combatant detention and 
military tribunal authorization statutes;206 and the 1996 alien terrorist 
removal system which has yet to be invoked.207 
In late 2005 and 2006, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment 
Act (DTA) and Military Commissions Act (MCA).208 This 
legislation, however, fails to provide guidelines that operate 
felicitously and reconcile security and liberty across multifarious 
circumstances because the legislation does not prescribe 
comprehensive strictures and because those measures afforded are 
overly solicitous of security. Until lawmakers prescribe thorough 
legislation, judges will devise techniques ad hoc. For example, 
Padilla's attorney filed in the District of South Carolina the very week 
the Justices ruled he must sue there, and the judge relied on habeas 
corpus to find that the Government lacked authority to detain 
Padilla.209 The Supreme Court also vacated and remanded Hamdi's 
petition, even though the United States quietly freed the detainee 
after thirty-four months of incarceration.210 
surveillance of defendants under FISA); COLE, supra note 3, at 67-68 (describing how the 
PATRIOT Act's amendments to FISA have eroded constitutional protections under the 
Fourth Amendment); PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURITY: 
WINNING WITHOUT WAR 105--06, 148-51 (2003) (explaining the Government's 
surveillance powers under FISA and speculating that its constitutionality would most 
likely be upheld); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KA y KANE, LA w OF FEDERAL 
COURTS 20 (6th ed. 2002) (using FISA as an illustration of when "Congress has made 
special provision for the designation of existing judges as a 'court' to perform particular 
functions"). 
206. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005); 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); see Carl 
Tobias, Punishment and the War on Terrorism, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1116, 1131 n.78 
(2004). The Restoring the Constitution Act of 2007 would amend certain features, such as 
enemy combatant designations and jurisdiction stripping, included in the Military 
Commissions Act. S. 576, llOth Cong. (2007). 
207. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37 (2000); see also Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1340 
(S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that the Alien Terrorist Removal Act was not applicable), affd, 
257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 205, at 20; Schuck, supra 
note 202; Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 202. The stakes will often be considerably more 
substantial in citizen indefinite detentions than in non-citizen removals. 
208. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005); Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(2006). 
209. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 (D.S.C. 2005); Dan Christensen & 
Vanessa Blum, Padilla Implicated in Florida Terror Case, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 20, 2004, at 
18. 
210. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11, 539 (2004); see Joel Brinkley & Eric 
Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Captured in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 12, 2004, at A15; Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 
12, 2004, at A2. 
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Despite the factors analyzed, it is possible to offer constructive 
guidance for the legislative branch and the federal judiciary. The 
suggestions provided depend on the H amdi opinions, to the extent 
that the resolution is binding and clear, although the Justices' 
treatment is general, laconic, ambiguous, and fragmented. Moreover, 
the recommendations elucidate, amplify, and supplement this 
disposition, when needed, and justify the views proffered. The ideas 
below will have equal relevance for other citizens who may be 
detained, like Padilla, but his apprehension and imprisonment on 
U.S. territory meant that he could well have deserved more rights and 
procedural advantages in challenging his enemy combatant 
designation and detention than the ones which are explored next.211 
D. Guidance 
1. General Recommendations 
The Supreme Court held that "a citizen-detainee seeking to 
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive 
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity 
to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker."212 Justice O'Connor grounded that holding on the 
test enunciated by Mathews. 213 She observed that this formulation 
requires the adjudicator to calculate the process due by weighing the 
effects of official conduct on the individual against the Government's 
situation, notably the harm which additional measures could foster, 
while balancing the risk that the private interest will suffer erroneous 
211. Hamdi's release meant that the ideas would have applied first to Padilla, had the 
United States not prosecuted him. See sources cited supra notes 14, 189, 209-10. Indeed, 
Judge Floyd's enunciation and application of habeas corpus may be preferable to the due 
process approach. For a sense of the national security-civil liberties spectrum, see 
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006); DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, 
LESS FREE: THE FAILURE OF PREEMPTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); JACK 
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2007); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMUELE, TERROR IN THE 
BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007); F.A.0. SCHWARZ & AZIZ 
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 
(2007). 
212. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. The major elaboration was that notice and hearing 
opportunity be "appropriate to the nature of the case" and be "granted at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner." Id. (citation omitted). 
213. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334--35 (1976). 
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deprivation, were process confined, and the likely value, if any, which 
greater or replacement mechanisms would yield.214 
Justice O'Connor neglected to articulate clearly the process that 
detainees must have.215 The decision did, however, mention two 
discrete categories of cases by implication. The first was exigent, 
referring to those cases with "uncommon potential to burden the 
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict," in which detained 
citizens would receive what Justice O'Connor denominated "core" 
notice and hearing before impartial decisionmakers.216 The second 
category, non-exigent cases, which the Court failed to define, would 
necessarily comprise the remaining cases. For this group, detainees 
would be accorded more process than the rudimentary notice and 
hearing granted in exigent cases, although the specifics of that process 
remain undefined.217 
I believe the Constitution, its judicial interpretation, as well as 
federal legislation and rules grant citizens designated enemy 
combatants most, if not all, of the procedures that defendants indicted 
for serious offenses receive, because the citizens may be indefinitely 
deprived of their liberty. The procedures encompass the Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, which circumscribe how the 
Government investigates behavior that is deemed a crime and how it 
prosecutes alleged violators, as well as devices in the United States 
Code and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence.218 
More specifically, the protections include: rights against improper 
searches and seizures, double jeopardy, and self-incrimination; the 
right to fair notice of the charges and an opportunity for assembling a 
defense; compulsory process for securing witnesses and relevant 
214. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; see also supra notes 51-52, 62-64 and accompanying 
text. See generally AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 35, at 180-82 (explaining the Mathews 
due process test). But see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
215. The Mathews test's use did lead Justice O'Connor to find the Government's 
proposed "some evidence" criterion imposed an unacceptably high risk that it would 
erroneously deprive a citizen of his liberty and to reject certain additional or replacement 
protections the Hamdi district court suggested, as they had limited probable value and 
might unduly burden the military. See supra notes 63-64, 80-83 and accompanying text. 
216. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see also supra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text; infra 
notes 279-83 and accompanying text. 
217. In exigent cases, national security and the Government would usually receive 
more solicitude than individual liberties and the detainee, while in non-exigent situations, 
the propositions would be reversed. However, the notion may be so generalized that it 
defies particularly effective use. 
218. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII; FED. R. CRIM. P.; FED. R. 
Evm. Virtually all of the applicable provisions of the United States Code are enumerated 
in Title 18, which principally defines federal criminal offenses. 
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evidence; the right to confront and cross examine witnesses; and the 
right to a full, adversarial trial in open court.219 
Several justifications support the provision of these rights to 
detainees. Most telling, the enemy combatant designation hearings 
are functionally equivalent to criminal proceedings because they 
might result in liberty's deprivation for life, a grave consequence 
highlighted by Justice O'Connor.22° Citizen detainees who may 
experience this fate, thus, should have greater rights and procedural 
benefits than many civil litigants and individuals accused of offenses 
whose situations are not as dire. 
Third, few rulings have required judges to balance the liberty 
interests of prosecuted adults against governmental interests as the 
Mathews Court did221 and as the Hamdi plurality envisioned.222 The 
most analogous opinions have implicated deprivations of liberty 
interests, which those seeking postconviction relief and juveniles 
vindicated.223 Citizens who are deemed enemy combatants and are 
deprived of their liberty also differ markedly from public assistance 
recipients who are judged ineligible and would forfeit this benefit or 
similar entitlements, the area where the Mathews calculus 
originated.224 Indeed, fifteen years ago the Justices rejected the 
formula as a broad-purpose yardstick. They emphatically declared 
219. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, 
§ 13.9. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004) (outlining the constitutional guarantees that 
accompany criminal procedure). The last idea in the text is the norm under the Sixth 
Amendment and in habeas cases. See generally United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1 
(1993) (holding that a charge of DUI and its accompanying maximum imprisonment term 
of six months is a petty offense and outside the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee). I 
rather comprehensively evaluate the proof burden below. 
220. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; see supra text accompanying note 56. For a rather similar 
analysis, see Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 195 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted, 
(Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427). 
221. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also supra notes 50-52, 63-64 
and accompanying text. 
222. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-34; see also supra notes 50-64, 146 and accompanying 
text. 
223. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229-35 (1990) (upholding a State's 
procedure for the involuntary administration of an inmate's medication); Schall v. Martin, 
467 U.S. 253, 274-81 (1984) (upholding the pretrial detention of juveniles when notice, a 
hearing, and a statement of facts were given prior to the detention). But see United States 
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 667-81 (1980) (relying on Mathews balancing test in holding that 
referral of a motion to suppress to a magistrate does not violate due process). See 
generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 13.9(a) (discussing the procedural due 
process required in cases that implicate a loss of physical liberty). 
224. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 574-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also sources cited supra 
notes 50-52. 
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that the Court had "invoked Mathews to resolve due process claims 
on only two occasions," questioning whether it was "essential to the 
results," and held that the Mathews balancing test is not appropriate 
for determining the legitimacy of state rules which are facets of the 
criminal process. 225 
If the Mathews notion could be justifiably transplanted from the 
somewhat inapposite public entitlement realm and applied to 
detentions, the detainee's liberty, a value that Justice O'Connor 
characterized as absolute,226 should outweigh the governmental needs. 
Even when reliance on techniques for protecting the individual's 
liberty might jeopardize security and, thus, arguably yield a different 
Mathews balance, the factfinder should consult and institute a number 
of efficacious measures-which lawmakers have prescribed and the 
judiciary has used-to vitiate, restrict, or ameliorate security 
threats.227 
Notwithstanding these factors-how the grievous impacts on 
citizens who may be adjudged enemy combatants demands the total 
panoply of criminal law strictures-Justice O'Connor failed to ratify, 
and might have disagreed with, these views. For example, she left 
untreated a critical safeguard implicit in due process: one should not 
be convicted unless found guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt."228 She 
actually imposed no proof burden on the United States and even 
observed that its tender may have a rebuttable presumption and 
could shift the burden to detainees in various circumstances,229 
225. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443-44 (1992). Patterson v. New York, 
432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977), prescribed what Mathews described as the correct due process 
approach, which remains so today. See LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219, 
§§ 2.7(c), 24.6(d). Justice Scalia said that the Mathews test "has no place where the 
Constitution and the common law already supply an answer." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 576 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). It is unclear why the Hamdi plurality relied so substantially on 
Mathews, rather than opinions, such as Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356--00 (1997), 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-83 (1992), and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 
(1987), because they address the precise question presented: the process due to insure 
that someone detained non-criminally is actually who the government alleges he is. See 
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 13.9, at 649-53 (assessing some of the cases). 
226. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530-31. Justice O'Connor mainly couched the 
governmental interest in national security terms, but other factors may be relevant. These 
include the fiscal resources that large numbers of hearings consume, typified by the 
Guantanamo detainees and other difficulties posed by federal court prosecutions of 
purported terrorists, such as Zacarias Moussaoui. See infra note 278 and accompanying 
text. 
227. Those mechanisms are canvassed supra notes 203--07 and accompanying text. 
228. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 21, § 13.9. Accord LAFAVE, ISRAEL & 
KING, supra note 219, §§ 10.4(a), 26.4(h). 
229. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534. 
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although Justices Souter and Ginsburg trenchantly disavowed the 
idea that the Government might enjoy a presumption casting some 
rebuttal burden on Hamdi.230 
Justice O'Connor also disparaged the rigor manifested by the 
trial court that addressed the Hamdi litigation. The jurist initially 
surmised that Judge Doumar favored what she rejected: using 
mechanisms similar to those required in a criminal trial and "quite 
extensive discovery of various military affairs ... [because] [a ]nything 
less . . . would not be 'meaningful judicial review.' "231 Justice 
O'Connor's dependence on the Mathews template similarly prompted 
her to find inappropriate numerous requirements gleaned from the 
criminal law arena, which she believed that the district judge 
envisioned. She considered unwarranted some " 'additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards' ... [recommended, given] their 
limited 'probable value' and the burdens they may impose on the 
military. "232 
This resolution suggests citizens ought to have, if not the rights 
which are granted to defendants charged with felonies, at least the 
measures afforded to habeas petitioners who lack both notice 
describing why the Executive detains them and hearings, a situation 
Quirin typifies. I have recounted the former, while the latter 
analyzed below include possible counsel, discovery, and use of 
evidentiary norms as well as the suggestion that the United States 
tender justifications for holding c1t1zens which they have 
opportunities to dispute.233 The severe consequences, if detainees are 
found to be enemy combatants, and Mathews's valuation of the 
process due underlie the procedures detainees should receive.234 
Factfinders who judge whether citizens were accurately detained 
must examine, and use throughout the hearings, a number of basic 
concepts. For instance, they should honor reciprocity and 
evenhandedness when selecting and deploying various techniques. 
Illustrative is Justice O'Connor's pronouncement that hearsay might 
230. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
accord id. at 554, 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
231. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528; see supra notes 15-17, 64, 197-200, 212 and accompanying 
text. 
232. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (citation omitted); see also supra notes 15-17, 64 and 
accompanying text. 
233. See supra notes 219 and accompanying text. The criminal regime may afford 
defendants fewer benefits than the civil one grants plaintiffs. See, e.g., infra notes 251-56 
and accompanying text. 
234. See supra notes 220 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 50--64, 220-27 and 
accompanying text. 
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warrant acceptance as the most reliable government evidence 
available.235 If this does materialize, there should be commensurate 
allowance for detainees' hearsay offers. Reciprocity and 
evenhandedness are major tenets of criminal procedure and evidence 
jurisprudence, while CIPA dictates reciprocity in specific contexts.236 
2. Specific Recommendations 
a. The Neutral Decisionmaker 
Justice O'Connor neither defined "unbiased arbiter" nor 
identified who would satisfy the command. She did offer the general 
rule that "even purportedly fair adjudicators 'are disqualified by their 
interest in the controversy,' " and broached the "possibility that the 
standards ... articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized 
and properly constituted military tribunal."237 Yet, Justice O'Connor 
neglected to detail the latter suggestion, including when the military 
entity should be used, and whether citizens whom the body decides 
were correctly detained may secure federal judicial relief. She did 
make multiple allusions to habeas petitioners and courts, while 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg vociferously disputed that "an 
opportunity to litigate before a military tribunal might obviate or 
truncate inquiry by a court on habeas."238 Furthermore, relevant 
decisions that involved World War II military proceedings, such as 
Quirin and analogous cases, would demand that judges hear 
challenges to tribunal determinations upholding enemy combatant 
designations.239 Even though lawmakers have now authorized 
commissions and prescribed how they function-which is a departure 
from the bodies unilaterally created by the November 2001 Executive 
Order-the tribunals may lack impartiality, as the decisionmakers 
235. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
236. See, e.g., Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 142 (1964); FED. R. CRIM. P. 2; 
FED. R. Evm. 106, 611; Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(f) 
(2000). See generally LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219, §§ 1.5(i), 1.5U), 2.4 
(describing the need for evenhandedness and fundamental fairness in criminal procedure). 
237. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538. Justice O'Connor left unclear what exactly would 
constitute a "disqualifying interest," whether military tribunals should be used in non-
exigent cases, and whether an administrative hearing could suffice. 
238. Id. at 546, 554 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis 
added). 
239. Ex Parle Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. l, 9 (1946). See 
generally A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 309 
(2003) (arguing that Quirin supports a broader view of the jurisdiction exercised by 
federal habeas corpus courts than asserted by the Government). 
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will remain in the military chain of command.240 A superior option is 
the federal judiciary whose lifetime appointment, undiminished pay, 
and venerable traditions, especially its reputation for independence, 
better guarantee neutrality.241 
b. Identification of Non-Exigent and Exigent Situations 
The arbiter should first decide whether "the exigencies of the 
circumstances" necessitate that these hearings "be tailored to 
alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time 
of ongoing military conflict."242 The assignment's fulfillment is vital, 
as it will suggest whether to use the rudimentary process which 
Justice O'Connor considered appropriate for exigent instances or 
techniques more solicitous of detainees. She voiced the greatest 
concern about national security but offered little guidance on when a 
military action is proceeding, indicia which are burdensome, or ways 
this duty to identify the type of situation could be satisfied.243 
One threshold query the factfinder should resolve is whether the 
decision to designate an individual as an enemy combatant implicates 
an ongoing military endeavor. If a military effort is clearly in 
progress, the decisionmaker should consult numerous factors related 
to security and discern whether the Executive will be overburdened. 
These include: where and when the Government apprehends the 
citizen and stages the hearing; the person's value as an intelligence 
240. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. § 2001 comp., at 918-21, 66 Fed. Reg. 
57, 833 (Nov. 16, 2001). See generally Bryant & Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, supra note 
96 (using the Youngstown framework to conclude that the President's Executive Order of 
November 13, 2001 cannot preclude those it covers from invoking the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts); Tim Golden, After Terror, A Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, § 1, at 1; Josh White, Panel for Detainees' Cases Cut in Half, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 22, 2004, at A12; supra text accompanying note 6; sources cited supra note 206. 
The DT A and the MCA sharply limit judicial review of military tribunal determinations, 
and the statutes purportedly strip federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction. But see 
Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 178-81 (1994) (holding that the presence of military 
judges in a chain of command does not deprive litigants of due process). Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), invalidated the unilaterally created tribunals. The MCA 
purportedly validated military tribunals. However, the Supreme Court's June 29, 2007 
grants of certiorari in two cases suggest that it will consider the new tribunals' validity. See 
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. 
June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195); Al-Odah v. United States, cert. granted, (U.S. June 29, 2007) 
(No. 06-1196). 
241. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Military tribunals at most should be reserved for 
extreme circumstances, such as battlefield captures, assuming arguendo that this elusive 
notion could be defined in the existing context. 
242. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
243. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-35; see also supra Part II.A.3. 
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source; the likelihood that military activities will be disrupted; or that 
valuable material, such as names of putative informants or troops' 
locations or battlefield strategies, might be revealed.244 
1. Non-Exigent Situations 
When the factfinder concludes that hearings will not burden the 
Executive while a military initiative proceeds, the adjudicator should 
generally review and dep~nd on a number of vaunted mechanisms. 
These could include several different requirements: those the 
judiciary uses in criminal prosecutions; the techniques Congress and 
judges have instituted for habeas attacks on executive detentions and 
that lawmakers have fashioned for related matters (particularly those 
implicating security, namely, hearings under CIPA, PISA, and the 
alien terrorist removal legislation). The justifications discussed 
earlier warrant application of these mandates.245 
a. Legal Representation 
Imprisoned citizens must then be notified of the opportunity for, 
and have access to, lawyers if they so wish. Justice O'Connor did not 
clarify whether indigent detainees enjoy a guarantee, but Justice 
Souter praised her "affirmation of Hamdi's right to counsel"246 while 
federal legislation offers attorneys to impecunious, detained non-
citizens who are threatened with removal.247 Even the Quirin 
defendants, individuals whom President Franklin Roosevelt believed 
warranted swift execution, had able counsel.248 Lawmakers must 
proffer attorneys for indigent detained citizens, as they will have few 
resources to oppose imprisonment. Until the Senate and House 
244. This list excludes factors, such as fiscal costs, treated supra note 226. A categorical 
approach-making battlefield captures exigent-lacks flexibility. For instance, even had 
Hamdi been seized there, a hearing in America three years later appears non-exigent. The 
approach that I suggest could afford the Government the opportunity to claim that all 
situations are exigent or involve state secrets, thus frontloading the due process inquiry. 
Judges should be aware of this possibility for tactical advantage and guard against it. 
Doubts should be resolved in the citizen's favor, as the impacts are so severe. 
245. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text. 
246. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539 {determining that Hamdi clearly had a right of access to 
counsel on remand); id. at 533 {Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 {1963). See 
generally LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219, §§ 6.4, 11.1 (outlining the 
constitutional right to counsel). 
247. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(l) (2000); see also sources cited supra note 207. 
248. The Nazi saboteurs had competent representation before the military commission 
as well as before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 6, at 195-96, 207-52; 
Bryant & Tobias, Quirin Revisited, supra note 239, at 319-23. 
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comprehensively legislate, the question might turn on the 
proceedings' denomination because the Court has not mandated 
representation of habeas petitioners who were found guilty, 
exhausted appeals, and then sued.249 Moreover, the detainee should 
have the opportunity for thorough, confidential deliberations with the 
lawyer and the requisite time to prepare fully for the hearings 
(although the United States monitored the cursory, initial sessions 
between Hamdi and his attorney after it denied them for two 
years).250 
b. Notice of Facts that Support the Enemy Combatant 
Designation 
Once those preliminary issues are resolved, the Government 
must afford the citizen notice of why it designated him an enemy 
combatant. Justice O'Connor provided only that this be appropriate 
to the setting and "be granted at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner;" however, that phrase's reiteration indicates the 
detainee should have the maximum facts which underlie the 
allegation that he was "part of or supporting forces hostile to the 
United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan and "engaged in 
an armed conflict against the United States" there.251 The quality of 
the opportunity to dispute the label will reflect the material which the 
Government tenders, and the impact for someone who is adjudged an 
enemy combatant will be profound. The detained citizen, therefore, 
should receive the most information with the greatest detail that will 
not jeopardize security, while the arbiter ought to employ numerous 
mechanisms which are treated below that help prevent revelation of 
valuable intelligence, as warranted. The floor must be the 
249. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. SSl, SSS (1987); see also LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219, § 11.1 (discussing 
the right to counsel in post-conviction relief). See generally supra note 203 and 
accompanying text. 
2SO. See Markon, supra note 9; Stuart Taylor Jr., A Failure of Leadership?, LEGAL 
TIMES, July S, 2004, at S4; see also sources cited supra note 204. If the selection of a 
private attorney should raise concerns involving national security, court appointment of a 
federal public defender, such as Hamdi's counsel, might furnish greater assurance. 
2Sl. Hamdi, S42 U.S. at S26, 533 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Concrete 
Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., S08 U.S. 602, 617 
(1993) (describing the due process requirement for a neutral decisionmaker); Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. S32, S42 (198S) (explaining the due process 
requirement for "some kind of hearing"); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80--81 (1972) 
(describing the importance of being provided notice and an opportunity to be heard); 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (19SO) (referring to the 
due process requirement for notice and opportunity to be heard). 
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certification's documentation, which the plurality asserted and the 
United States recognized, the military can easily locate.252 
Yaser Hamdi's situation is illustrative. The only evidentiary 
basis for classifying him was the Mobbs declaration, a nine-paragraph 
affidavit compiled by a Government official who lacked first-hand 
knowledge about the detainee. Reliance on this affidavit that did not 
explain various ideas-namely, its sources and the conditions under 
which the data were gathered, the criteria applied when designating 
Hamdi, and whether the United States possessed exculpatory 
material-would have given the citizen an insufficient rebuttal 
opportunity. 
c. Detainee Access to Information 
The factfinder must grant, basically through discovery, access to 
the maximum relevant information that is consistent with the 
protection of national security. Justice O'Connor analyzed the 
central issues only tangentially, yet her demand that the citizen enjoy 
a fair rebuttal opportunity requires that he have all the pertinent 
material which justifies the designation.253 For Hamdi, this might 
have included his statements while in custody; the individuals and 
documents Michael Mobbs consulted when drafting his affidavit; and 
the papers that the Government would tender at the hearings. 
Lawmakers have also prescribed access. For example, the 
habeas and alien terrorist regimes, as well as CIP A and FISA, 
generally manage information flow in similar contexts. The habeas 
legislation authorizes petitioners to take evidence orally or by 
deposition, interrogatory, or affidavit. It also implements rules which 
govern some habeas matters, empowering judges to use the federal 
rules-insofar as they do not violate the habeas provisions-and 
allows discovery under the federal strictures for good cause.254 When 
other habeas rules are silent regarding access to information, the 
judiciary can proceed in any legal way that honors the rules and 
applicable U.S. Code sections, or it can decide motions under the 
252. See supra note 51, 71, 214 and accompanying text. Civil process grants little notice 
and criminal affords even less. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8; FED. R. CRIM. P. 3, 7, 9-11. 
253. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see also supra notes 65-66, 83, 202, 251 and 
accompanying text. 
254. 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254, R. 6 Governing § 2254 Cases in the 
United States District Courts (2004); see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 203, § 19.4 
(describing discovery and Rule 6 in greater detail). See generally B.racy v. Gramley, 520 
U.S. 899 (1997) (addressing discovery requests in habeas proceedings); Harris v. Nelson, 
394 U.S. 286 (1969) (same); Harris v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 1996) (same), cert. 
denied, 517 U.S. 1227 (1996). 
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Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure.255 The alien terrorist 
removal law also enables district judges to issue subpoenas for 
witnesses' appearance and to compel the production of documents or 
similar objects which are clearly needed to resolve material issues.256 
d. Burden of Proof 
The arbiter should next determine who has the burden of proof 
and what the relevant standard is. Justice O'Connor left these 
questions unaddressed for instances which are not exigent, yet she 
found that the Government's tender, if credible, might have a 
rebuttable presumption, and shift the burden to the detainee, in 
exigent cases.257 This material should be given little weight for non-
exigent cases, however, as the usual doctrine requires that litigants 
asserting a fact prove it beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal 
proceedings and by a preponderance of the evidence in civil 
matters.258 
The jurist did intimate that the Government must show the 
citizen was "part of or supporting forces hostile to [the nation] or 
coalition partners" in Afghanistan and "engaged in an armed conflict 
against the United States" there.259 Justice O'Connor, thus, 
apparently required that the Government establish two important 
facts: (1) the detainee was a member of, or supported, hostile forces 
in Afghanistan; and (2) battled there with the United States. This 
quotation reflects the "enemy combatant" notion developed by the 
Government for the ongoing military initiative; however, tenets 
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, R. 6 Governing§ 2554 Cases in the United States District Courts 
(2004); see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 203, §§ 41.1-41.8 (describing § 2255 
habeas procedures for federal prisoners). Criminal process allows less discovery than civil, 
but Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957), grants "defendants" more. See FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 16; LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 219, §§ 14.2(b)-15.3(a). 
256. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (d)(l) (2000). If the enemy combatant hearings are criminal, 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), would require the U.S. to provide the "defendant" 
favorable information. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. 
Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3-4 (2002). For a recent 
opinion that analyzes numerous issues regarding detainee access to information, see 
generally Bismullah v. Gates, Nos. 06-1197, 06-1397, 2007 WL 2067938 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 
2007). 
257. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534, 538 (2004); see also supra note 67--08 and accompanying 
text. 
258. See infra notes 262--04 and accompanying text. 
259. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief for 
the Respondents at 3, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6698)); see also COLE, supra note 3 
(characterizing the treatment of Hamdi and Padilla as "pav[ing] the way for what will be 
done to American citizens tomorrow"); Engle, supra note 5 (discussing conceptions of 
non-citizens within the United States as hostile to U.S. interests). 
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relating to authority and separation of powers might have led 
Congress to modify Justice O'Connor's articulation of what must be 
proved.260 The jurist also repudiated as "inadequate" the "some 
evidence" theory which the administration championed when it 
opposed the Hamdi and Padilla litigation because the idea embodied 
a "standard of review, not ... of proof," while due process commands 
that detainees have a way to challenge their designations.261 
The factfinder must impose on the Government the burden to 
show-preferably by clear and convincing evidence, arguably beyond 
a reasonable doubt, or at least by a preponderance of the evidence-
that it has met the criteria for designating a citizen an enemy 
combatant. The Justices never require evidence which is less than 
clear and convincing to authorize the substantial deprivation of a 
citizen's liberty, so prescribing this burden would reaffirm the ideal 
that "liberty is the norm and detention without a trial is the carefully 
limited exception."262 The Court also mandates proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt when one is said to act illegally.263 A 
preponderance of the evidence burden governs most civil lawsuits 
and alien terrorist removal.264 
e. Evidence 
Although the Hamdi plurality neglected to mention the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, the decisionmaker must scrutinize and apply to 
the greatest practicable extent the contemporary understandings 
imposed by those federal rules,265 which the judiciary deploys in civil 
260. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 202, 258 and 
accompanying text. 
261. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537; see also supra notes 18-19, 46-47, 80--83, 94 and 
accompanying text. 
262. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 
(1987)); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (explaining the importance 
of establishing a standard of proof in the detention context); Jones v. United States, 463 
U.S. 354, 361 (1983) (discussing due process requirements in the context of mental health 
commitments). See generally Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the President lacked inherent constitutional authority to detain the alien petitioner as 
an enemy combatant), reh'g en bane granted, (Aug. 22, 2007) (No. 06-7427). 
263. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 
U.S. 684, 703--04 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970); see also H.R. 1290 
§ 4(a)(15), 108th Cong. (2003) (prescribing the standard). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 21, § 13.9. 
264. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 337, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES (5th ed. 
1999); 8 u.s.c. § 1534(g) (2000). 
265. FED. R. EVID.; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 264 (surveying how the burden 
of proof is apportioned). See generally WI GMO RE ON EVIDENCE (1983). 
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and criminal litigation.266 For instance, the arbiter would exercise 
broad discretion to judge witness credibility and the admissibility, 
relevance, reliability, and weight of evidence.267 Thus, the factfinder 
should infrequently admit hearsay offered by the Government when 
situations are non-exigent.268 Adherence to the rules is warranted 
because they incorporate concepts which judges have long honored 
and applied to foster equitable disposition. 
Justice O'Connor did remark that a habeas court in the new 
proceedings "may accept affidavit evidence" similar to the material 
which designated Hamdi, so long as detainees might contest the 
designations; however, she appeared to be referencing exigent 
instances and suggested that the government must prove the 
continuing military action leaves non-hearsay unavailable.269 
Therefore, if the scenario is non-exigent, reliance on affidavits would 
generally be improper. Should the hearsay nevertheless be admitted, 
the United States must at least produce those reports and records on 
which it is based-documentation that Justice O'Connor maintained, 
and the Government said, is now "kept in the ordinary course of 
military affairs."270 The harsh ramifications for a detainee who is 
found correctly designated mean that the testimony of an official with 
immediate, and purportedly extensive, knowledge about the label will 
be valuable, insofar as allowing this submission is feasible. These 
recommendations would better enable the citizen to probe the 
designation and the arbiter to scrutinize its validity and judge 
reliability, and the federal evidentiary measures include preferences 
for non-hearsay as well as for live testimony.271 
266. The alien terrorist removal legislation abjures reliance on the federal rules. See 8 
u.s.c. § 1534(h) (2000). 
267. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 264 (surveying how the burden of proof is 
apportioned). CIPA allows the government to seek analogous determinations about 
classified data. See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6 (2000); see 
also sources cited supra note 204. 
268. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34, 538 (2004). 
269. See id. at 538 (first emphasis added). I analyze the ideas in this paragraph in the 
event that I have misjudged her view or the arbiter allows this proffer in non-exigent 
situations and because the Government's case is also considered at this juncture. 
270. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534; accord Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 369, 374-75 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); see also supra notes 71, 
252 and accompanying text. 
271. See FED. R. Evm. 804; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 264, § 245. See generally 
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 804.01-804.02, 804.03[6][c] (Joseph McLaughlin, 
ed., 2007) (discussing the hearsay exceptions that apply when witnesses are unavailable). 
Hamdi's circumstances elucidate these concepts because reliance on the Mobbs 
declaration would not have sufficed. 
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f Detainee's Rebuttal 
Once the United States has justified the enemy combatant label, 
the plurality dictated that the individual must have a "fair opportunity 
to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker."272 Justice O'Connor emphasized these requirements, 
yet she posited limited guidance apart from the notions that the 
hearings would reflect the context and would be "granted at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. "273 
The opportunity to rebut should encompass the detainee's 
testimony, testimony furnished by people who support the citizen, 
related oral or documentary input which the detainee adduces, and 
cross examination of U.S. witnesses. The factfinder must permit the 
detainee to offer the greatest information and tender the most 
effective response consistent with national security and the federal 
rules, as his liberty will be at stake. These views, and the abilities to 
dispute the classification, underscore the importance of legal 
representation. 
g. National Security, Civil Liberties, and Protective Mechanisms 
Justice O'Connor evinced concern about the foundational 
precepts of security and liberty and the importance of meticulously 
reconciling them when opposed. For example, her decision voiced 
confidence that judges would determine the core facts in a "prudent 
and incremental" way and "pay proper heed" to security and liberty, 
which she observed can be in tension.274 However, Justice O'Connor 
analyzed few means of realizing those goals.275 
To the extent that the detainee's presentation or his cross 
examination may jeopardize security, the adjudicator should review 
and use numerous, time-honored devices which foster that interest, 
safeguard liberty, and accommodate both when they conflict. These 
encompass protective orders as well as the military and state secret 
privileges, which shield classified data.276 Related techniques are ex 
272. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see supra note 65 and accompanying text. Fair rebuttal 
would require full notice and access to the Government's basis for the designation. See 
supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text. 
273. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 537-38 (citations omitted); see supra note 66 and 
accompanying text. 
274. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539; see also supra notes 53--64, 88 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. In fairness, Justice O'Connor did 
proffer a rather significant number of concrete suggestions. See, e.g., supra notes 229, 237, 
253,259,261,272-73. 
276. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e) (2000); Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 
U.S.C. app. 3 § 3 (2000); see also United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799-801 (2d Cir. 
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parte and in camera inspections of material that would ostensibly 
undermine security, with dependence on alternatives, especially 
summaries, if needed, which Justice O'Connor broached and CIPA, 
FISA and the alien terrorist reQ1oval legislation prescribe.277 Closed 
hearings, when indicated, and document redaction are similar 
mechanisms that judges have employed for the Hamdi and Padilla 
litigation and the criminal prosecution against Zacarias Moussaoui.278 
The basic, opposed values of security and liberty and the admonitions 
by Justice O'Connor warrant reliance on those methods. 
2. Exigent Situations 
When the factfinder definitively ascertains that a continuing 
military initiative demands procedural tailoring to burden the 
Executive less, a few concepts which obtain in non-exigent scenarios 
will apply. Illustrative are access to the premises that underlie the 
designation and the opportunity for representation, which are 
furnished citizens, as well as many additional strictures that I have 
evaluated.279 
1996) (detailing CIPA's process for the disclosure of classified information); El-Masri v. 
United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302-13 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that the state secrets privilege 
precluded litigation under the Alien Tort Statute); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 
2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (outlining the state secrets privilege); Am. Civil Liberties 
Union v. Nat'! Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758-66 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding that 
the state secrets privilege did not apply to the National Security Agency's data mining 
program), rev'd, Nos. 06-2095/06-2140, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16149, 2007 FED App. 
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(W.D. Wash. 2002) (applying CIPA and state secrets privilege). See generally Adam 
Liptak, A Case So Shielded One Side Is in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007, at AlO 
(discussing appeals of two cases involving state secrets privilege). 
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prosecution fostered certain difficulties which these measures do not resolve. See United 
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2007, at Al. See generally Liptak, supra note 276 (discussing extreme secrecy in cases 
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The decisionmaker should also consider the Hamdi guidance and 
other pertinent measures, namely the CIP A, FISA, and alien terrorist 
removal schemes, and effectuate techniques that could obviate or 
limit difficulties the hearings might provoke. For instance, Justice 
O'Connor said that the adjudicator may need to treat hearsay as most 
reliable, yet she was not countenancing wholesale admission because 
she indicated that the Government would have to demonstrate how a 
military effort necessitates the use of hearsay.280 Justice O'Connor 
also thought that the factfinder might grant the United States' 
contribution a rebuttable presumption, so long as the individual has a 
fair opportunity to dispute the material.281 Accordingly, when there is 
credible evidence that the detainee satisfies the enemy combatant 
designation standards, he may have to rebut this "with more 
persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria."282 If litigation 
tactics before or at the hearings jeopardize security, the arbiter should 
invoke the mechanisms I have discussed, such as provisos which 
Congress designed to rectify that eventuality.283 
c. Summary By Way of Justifications 
Numerous themes justify this guidance. The measures proposed 
protect security and liberty through assessment, calibration, and 
reconciliation of the fundamental, and occasionally divergent, tenets. 
For example, imposing the proof burdens analyzed on the 
Government in non-exigent situations and a rebuttable presumption, 
when its tender is credible, on the detainee for exigent ones 
accommodates the two values and the litigants. The ideas 
concomitantly honor Justice O'Connor's delicate balance and her 
perspectives while elaborating, augmenting, and refining the 
concepts. Judges have also used for decades a number of techniques, 
such as in camera evaluations and document redaction, which 
safeguard America and the citizen. Moreover, designating the 
judiciary as factfinders promotes neutral, equitable decisionmaking. 
Furthermore, the suggestions afford much concrete guidance, with 
dependence on venerable principles; namely, the rules of evidence 
and habeas, but judges will maintain flexibility to address diverse 
280. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34, 538-39 (2004); see also supra notes 
68, 87 and accompanying text. 
281. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534, 538-39; see also supra notes 68, 87 and accompanying 
text. 
282. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534; see also supra notes 69, 257-58 and accompanying 
text. 
283. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances. The views also respect separated powers by, for 
instance, urging that lawmakers and the Executive work together and 
implement expeditiously comprehensive measures that govern the 
hearings, while practical advice is furnished for decisionmakers who 
will conduct them. 
CONCLUSION 
The detention of U.S. citizens through designation as enemy 
combatants poses intractable dilemmas related to national security, 
civil liberties, and the distribution of federal governmental authority. 
The Hamdi Supreme Court plurality treated some questions when it 
held that detentions are valid but that citizens must receive due 
process. However, the Justices identified few mechanisms which 
should apply, and certain specifics that were delineated remain 
unclear. Fourth Circuit disposition of these and closely related issues 
has also lacked clarity. If judges follow the guidance which this 
Article offers, they can elucidate detention jurisprudence and balance 
security and liberty. Congress in turn should review and use the ideas 
offered in the Article to pass thorough legislation. 
